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Understanding Prosecutorial Discretion in the
United States: The Limits of Comparative

Criminal Procedure as an Instrument of Reform
WILIA

T. PIZzI*

Drawing by Alain; 01955, 1983

The New Yotier Magazine. Inc.
All Riglits Rcemved

I. INTRODUCTION

The above cartoon from an old New Yorker magazine demonstrates in an
amusing way the extent to which we are all prisoners of our own culture and
tradition. The notion that the rigidly stylized art of the Egyptians was the result
* Professor of Law, University of Colorado School of Law. The author is grateful to
many people who have helped him over the years to understand the civil law tradition, but
especially to Danish jurists Anna Grete Stokholm and Torben Plessing, Suzanne Walther
and Walter Perron of the Max Planck Institute in Freiburg and Luca Marafioti of II
University of Rome at Tor Vergata. The author is also grateful to Peter Hofstrom and
Nathan Coats for their helpful comments and suggestions on a draft of this Article.
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of careful efforts to copy nature seems humorous to us. But the cartoon has a
serious point to make as well: It is a reminder that what seems natural and
realistic to some may appear stylized and even distorted to those who do not
share the same history and cultural background.I
To a considerable extent the same is true of different systems of criminal
procedure. Procedures for determining guilt that seem to those educated in one
legal tradition to offer a fair and efficient way of determining guilt or innocence
may seem awkward and stylized when viewed by those who have been
educated in a different legal tradition. Comparative criminal procedure has
become an area of considerable interest among legal scholars because the study
of diverse systems of criminal procedure offers scholars and students a way of
getting outside their own legal tradition so as to gain valuable perspectives on
their own system. In much the same way, exposing the young Egyptian artists
in the New Yorker cartoon to a completely different artistic tradition from
another part of the world might enable those artists to see more clearly
important elements of their own artistic style and tradition.
For American scholars, the study of the civil law tradition as embodied in
the legal systems of European countries, such as Germany 2 and France,3 has
been particularly rewarding. 4 These systems seem to function with efficiency
and reliability while appearing to treat those who come into contact with the
system, such as defendants and victims, with respect. Because the United States
shares many societal values in common with these countries, the discovery that
European countries have such radically different systems of criminal procedure,
makes those systems excellent subjects for comparative study. 5 When
Americans study the continental systems of criminal procedure, they come to
understand that what they had considered to be necessary truths about the
proper way for evidence to be gathered, or for trials to be conducted in any
1 For a fascinating exploration of the psychology of representation and the effects of

culture and background on what we "see" when we look at works of art, see E.H.
GOMBRiCH, ART AND ILLUSION (2d ed. rev. 1961).
2 See, e.g., JOHN H. LANIGBEiN, COMPARATIvE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: GERMANY
(1977) [hereinafter LANGBEIN, GERMANY]; John H. Langbein, Land Without Plea

Bargaining:How the Germans Do It, 78 MIcH. L. REv. 204 (1979) [hereinafter Langbein,
Land Without PleaBargaining].
3 See, e.g., LLOYD L. WEIInRa, DENIAL OF JUSTICE (1977); Richard S. Frase,
Comparative Qnzimnal Justice as a Guide to American Law Refom: How Do the French Do
It, How Can We Find Out, and Why Should We Care?, 78 CAL. L. REy. 539, 612-40
(1990).
4 See, e.g., JOHNH. MERRYMAN, THE CVLLAWTRADmON 2-3 (2d ed. 1985).
5 See, e.g., John H. Langbein, ControllingProsecutorialDiscretionin Gemnany, 41 U.
CHI. L. REV. 439, 439-40 (1974) [hereinafter Langbein, Controlling Prosecutorial
Discretion].
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legal system that shares certain values, are perhaps only contingent truths that
have application in our system, but not in others that do not share the same
6
history and political tradition.
But there seems to be a strong temptation among comparativists in criminal
procedure to go beyond comparative study and suggest that the American legal
system might well benefit from adopting by way of reform certain principles or
procedures that seem so sensible and workable in civil law systems. This
Article sounds a strong cautionary note about efforts to reform the American
criminal justice system by incorporating into it elements borrowed from
systems within the civil law tradition. 7 In the first place, certain aspects of
European criminal procedure run counter to important tenets of American
political ideology making it unlikely that they would find significant political
support in the United States. Secondly, the fact that certain of the players in the
civil law tradition occupy positions that seem to correspond to those occupied
by judges, prosecutors, and defense attorneys in the United States often hides
the fact that their attitudes, training, and responsibilities are very different,
making it unlikely that procedures that work well in one system could work as
well in a different legal system.
To make its cautionary point about comparative criminal procedure as a
tool of reform, this Article focuses on a subject that has attracted considerable
interest from comparativists: the contrast between the American prosecutor,
armed with broad discretion, and prosecutors in the civil law tradition, who
have much less discretion and are subject to close judicial supervision. 8 In these
6 In this regard, the writings of Professor Mijan Damaska are particularly important

because they enable readers to see different systems of criminal procedure as a reflection of
different political traditions and values. See MJAN R. DAMA YA, THE FACES OF JUSTICE
AND STATE AUTHORrrY (1986).
7 For an analysis of an attempt to transplant features of the American adversary system
into a legal system built on civil law traditions and civil law institutions, see William T.
Pizzi & Luca Marafioti, The New Italian Code of Oiminal Procedure: The Difficulties of
Building an Adversarial Tial System on a Qvil Law Foundation, 17 YALE J. INr'L L. 1

(1992).
8 See, e.g., KENNHr C. DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE: A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY
(1969) [hereinafter DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE]; Joachim Herrmann, The Gernan
Prosecutor,in DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE IN EUROPE AND AMERICA 16 (Kenneth C. Davis ed.,

1976); Joachim Herrmann, The Rule of Compu/sory Prosecution and the Scope of
Prosecutorial Discretion in Gernany, 41 U. II. L. Rnv. 468 (1974) [hereinafter
Herrmann, The Rule of Compusory Prosecution]; Langbein, Controlling Prosecutorial
Discretion, spra note 5; Robert Vouin, The Role of the Prosecutor in French Criminal
Trials, 18 AM. J. COMP. L. 483, 488-92 (1970); Thomas Weigend, Continental Cures for
American Ailments: European Crim'nalProcedure as a Model for Law Reform, 2 CRIME &

JUST. 381 (1980).
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comparisons, the American prosecutor always seems to suffer from the
comparison with continental counterparts. We are told, for example, that "the
German prosecutor's discretion is consistently controlled all along the line, and
that the American prosecutor's discretion is consistently uncontrolled all along
the line." 9

This Article also compares the American prosecutor with civil law
counterparts, but it does so with the objective of giving a more complete
account of the American prosecutor and the power that is vested in that
position. This Article contends that the role of the prosecutor is different in the
two traditions because, among other things, certain elements of political
ideology between the two systems are different, certain values emphasized in
the systems are different, and the role of the judge and the nature of trials are
different in the two systems. This Article demonstrates that our concept of
prosecutorial power is so tied to important tenets of our American political
tradition that reforming the American prosecutor along the lines in the civil law
model, as has occasionally been proposed, 10 would be far more difficult than it
might initially appear.
While this Article is comparative in nature, contrasting features of the civil
law tradition with corresponding aspects of the American adversary tradition, it
is not a defense of the American prosecutor vis-A-vis the civil law prosecutor.
This Article is written from a point of view that is respectful of the civil law
tradition and accepts the fact that civil law prosecutors have much less
discretion than American prosecutors, not so much because judges keep tight
check on civil law prosecutors, as much as the fact that, ideologically,
prosecutors in the civil law tradition see their job as much narrower in focus
than do American prosecutors." Rather this Article is a defense of the
9 Kenneth C. Davis, Amercan Comments on American and Gennan Prosecutors, in
DISCRETIONARYJUsTICE IN EUROPE AND AMERICA at 60, 61 (Kenneth C. Davis ed., 1976).

10 See, e.g., Frase, supra note 3, at 612-40 (suggesting problems with American
prosecutorial discretion that could be remedied by adopting reforms modeled on French
criminal procedures that would restrict (1) the American prosecutor's ability to decline
prosecution, (2) the American prosecutor's ability to reduce charges, and (3) the American
prosecutor's ability to engage in plea bargaining). See also infra notes 12-15 and
accompanying text (discussing Professor Kenneth C. Davis's use of the German prosecutor
as showing both the desirability and the feasibility of reforms of American prosecutorial
discretion).
11 This Article is thus not an attempt to revive the controversy engendered by
Abraham Goldstein and Martin Marcus when they claimed that civil law restrictions on
prosecutorial discretion are all theory and not practice. Abraham S. Goldstein & Martin
Marcus, The Myth of Judicial Supervision in Three "Inquisitorial"Systems: France, Italy
and Germany, 87 YALE L.. 240, 279-83 (1977) [hereinafter Goldstein & Marcus, Myth of
Judicial Supervision]. Because limited prosecutorial discretion is central to the civil law
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American prosecutor within the American adversary tradition, using the civil
law system as a contrast to explain why the role of the prosecutor has evolved

in a very different way in the American adversary tradition.
Such a defense of the American prosecutor has been long overdue. The
American prosecutor has been under nearly constant attack in the criminal
procedure literature, at least since the publication of Professor Kenneth Culp
Davis's influential book, Discretionary Justice: A Preliminary Inquiry, in
1968.12 In his book, Professor Davis strongly attacked American prosecutorial
discretion and argued that it should be sharply limited. 13 He used the very
different role played by the German prosecutor to demonstrate that it was not
only desirable to reform the American prosecutor, but feasible as well. 14 Many
of Professor Davis's criticisms of American prosecutors and their discretion
tradition, the Goldstein and Marcus article engendered a heated reply by Professors John H.
Langbein & Lloyd L. Weinreb, two strong admirers of the civil law tradition. John H.
Langbein and Lloyd L. Weinreb, Continental Criminal Procedure: "Myth" and Reality, 87
YALE LJ. 1549 (1978). Goldstein and Marcus replied in turn. Abraham S. Goldstein &
Martin Marcus, Comment on Continental Ominal Procedure, 87 YALE L.J. 1570 (1978).
In a later article on plea bargaining, Professor Langbein renewed his attack on the Goldstein
and Marcus article. Langbein, Land Without Plea Bargaining, supra note 2, at 215-16,
219.
Whatever the reality is as to how weak cases get dismissed from the system, the author
believes firmly, in part from having lived in civil law countries, that there are major
differences in the way that judges and prosecutors in the two systems understand their
functions and the way they evaluate cases. See Miijan Damaska, The Reality of
ProsecutorialDiscretion: Coments on a Gernan Monograph, 29 AM. J. COMI. L. 119,
131 (1981). The author hopes that this Article will help the reader understand why
prosecutors in the two systems see things from such different perspectives.
12 See, e.g., DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JusncE, supra note 8 (suggesting that American
prosecutorial discretion should be sharply limited and controlled and offering Germany as
the model to be followed); Davis, supra note 9 at 60-72 (comparing unfavorably American
prosecutorial discretion and the carefully controlled discretion of the German prosecutor);
Frase, supra note 3 at 612-40 (suggesting that we adopt reforms modeled on French
criminal procedures that would restrict (1) the American prosecutor's ability to decline
prosecution, (2) the American prosecutor's ability to reduce charges, and (3) the American
prosecutor's ability to engage in plea bargaining); Herrmann, The Rule of Compulsory
Prosecution, supra note 8, at 468-69 (suggesting problems with American prosecutorial

discretion).
13 "The reasonsfor a judicial check ofprosecutors' discretion are stronger than for
such a check of other administrative discretion that is now traditionally reviewable.
Important interests are at stake. Abuses are common. The questions involved are
appropriate for judicial determination. And much injustice could be corrected." DAVIS,
DISCRETIONARYJUSTICE, supra note 8, at 211-12.
14 Id.at 192-93, 212.
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were adopted and expanded upon by Professor James Vorenberg in his attack
5
on American prosecutors and their discretion.1
The author believes that the critics of American prosecutorial discretion,
such as Davis and Vorenberg, have been unfair to the many highly professional
prosecutors' offices that exist in this country, making the repose of broad
charging and plea bargaining discretion in those offices seem inexplicable,
when it is not so, and also making it seem as though the exercise of such power
seems always arbitrary and abusive, when that is also not the case. But while
this Article is a defense of American prosecutorial discretion, it is a "gentle"
defense to the extent that it makes no empirical claim that abuse of
prosecutorial discretion is not a problem, 16 and perhaps even a very serious
one in some jurisdictions in the United States. In a large country with so many
jurisdictions, not only can the quality of prosecutors vary considerably from
state to state, but even within the same state there can be differences. Much the
same can be said for the quality of judges, public defenders, and the police as
well. But this Article has an important point to make even if we decide that
abuse of prosecutorial discretion is a major problem within the United States.
We ought to have no illusions that reforming prosecutorial discretion would be
an easy task. The idea that we can leave our criminal justice system and our
legal tradition substantially intact, but yet achieve meaningful reform of
prosecutorial discretion by borrowing mechanisms for controlling such
discretion from the civil law tradition is mistaken and unfair to both great
traditions.
This Article is divided into six parts. Part II gives a brief overview of the
civil law tradition, using the German system as a representative example,
because it is the system most discussed in the American literature and one with
which the author has some familiarity. Part III deals with the American
prosecutor and tries to show the sorts of pressures and controls that bear on the
way that American prosecutors exercise their discretion, including political
pressures and adversarial pressures, that have no strong counterpart in the civil
law tradition. Part IV deals with the theoretical and practical problems that
would arise in the American legal system by the sort of close judicial review of
prosecutorial discretion that is commonplace in the civil law tradition. Part V
15

See James Vorenberg, DecentRestraint of ProsecutorialPower, 94 HARv. L. REv.

1521 (1981).
16 Professor Davis's picture of prosecutors is quite dismal. He indicates that

prosecutors, if left on their own to limit their discretion, "do little or nothing." DAvis,
DISCRETIONARYJUSTICE, supranote 8, at 196. He also states that "abuses are common." Id.
at 212. In addition, he gives the interesting statistic that "[pierhaps nine-tenths of the abuses
of the prosecuting power involve failure to prosecute." Id. at 191 n.2. The data on which
these conclusions rest is not provided.
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deals with the most troubling and controversial aspect of prosecutorial
discretion in our criminal justice system: prosecutorial discretion as it is
brought to bear in plea bargaining, particularly when such plea bargaining
limits the sentencing options of the judge. Part VI deals with a specific
proposal for controlling prosecutorial discretion that is raised so often that the
author believes it deserves separate treatment: the idea that prosecutors should
be required to limit their discretion through the adoption of announced
guidelines that would explain how particular types of cases will be handled by
that particular office. That Part will show how difficult it would be to try to
capture the sorts of factors that go into a prosecutorial decision in a set of
guidelines and why prosecutors' offices, even quite excellent offices, would be
reluctant to adopt a formal set of guidelines.
H. A BRIEF INTRODUCTION TO CRIMINAL PROCEDURE INTHE
CIVIL LAW TRADITION
As the introduction indicates, this Article focuses more heavily on the
American adversary tradition and the role of the prosecutor in that tradition
than it does on the civil law tradition. This Article uses the civil law tradition
mainly as a reference point and a contrast which helps in understanding the
philosophical and political premises that underlie the American adversary
tradition. This Part is intended to give those readers who are unfamiliar with
civil law tradition, an introduction to that tradition. The German system is used
when specifics are necessary.
In the civil law model, the system of criminal procedure is set out in a
sophisticated code that lays out in detail what is to happen at each step of the
procedure from the initial report of the crime to the police, up through trial,
appeal, and even service of any sentence that has been imposed. Instead of
having to look to a variety of sources of law as is the case with American
criminal procedure-such as federal constitutional law, state constitutional law,
rules of criminal procedure, rules of evidence, statutory rights, and local
practice-the code of criminal procedure in a civil law country is the dominant
authority for the proper conduct of the proceedings including a criminal
investigation, criminal trial, and criminal appeal. 17
The prosecutor in the civil law model is a career civil servant who works
in a hierarchically organized system in which promotions up the career ladder
are merit based and in which the prosecutor is isolated from political
17 For an excellent discussion of the central place codes occupy in the civil law
tradition and the rationalistic ideology embodied in such codes, see MERRYMAN, supra note
4, at 26-33.
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pressures. 18 The main function of the prosecutor in the system is to control the
investigation of any reported crime, to assemble a complete and balanced file or
"dossier" that would contain the results of that investigation, and to file
appropriate criminal charges if the evidence shows that a crime has been
committed. 19 Up until the middle of the nineteenth century in Germany, the
pretrial investigation as well as the trial was controlled by the trial judge, but
the office of the state's attorney was developed in order to separate the power
of investigation from the power of adjudication. 20 The office of the German
prosecutor, being thus an outgrowth of the judiciary, remains a judicial figure
21
in terms of professional status and tradition.
A German prosecutor's discretion with respect to the decision whether or
not to file criminal charges is more limited in comparison to American
prosecutors. The practice of prosecutors today is an outgrowth of the civil law
tradition of "compulsory prosecution," 22 which demands that a prosecutor file
criminal charges whenever the evidence is strong enough to support such
charges.23 While the doctrine of compulsory prosecution has softened with the
passage of time and the realities of modem caseloads, it still remains fair to say
that a prosecutor's charging discretion in non-minor criminal cases remains
limited.2 4 In the first place, the tradition of compulsory prosecution encourages
18

LANaBEN, GERMANY,

supranote 2, at 91; see Frase, supra note 3, at 563-64.

19 See Langbein, ControllingProsecutorialDiscretion, supranote 5, at 446-48.
20
IL at 448-49.
21 Id.
22

The principle of compulsory prosecution in Germany is contained in section 152(2)
of the German Code of Criminal Procedure which Professor Langbein translates as follows:
"[The public prosecutor] is required... to take action against all judicially punishable...
acts, to the extent that there is a sufficient factual basis." Langbein, Controlling
ProsecutorialDiscretion,supra note 5, at 443.
In Italy, the principle of compulsory prosecution is enshrined in the Italian
Constitution. CosT. art. 112. See generally Pizzi & Marafioti, supra note 7, at 9-12
(comparing procedural discretion in Italy and the United States).
23 See Wjan Damak, Structures ofAuthority and Conparative CriminalProcedure,
84 YALE LJ.480, 503-04 (1975).
24 Over the years, this doctrine has, in the words of one German scholar, become
"encrusted with exceptions." Weigend, supra note 8, at 401. But even though admitting of
exceptions, the discretion of the German prosecutor remains limited when compared to
American prosecutors. Id. at 402-03; see also Herrmann, The Rule of Conmpulsory
Prosecution, supra note 8, at 474-75; Langbein, Controlling ProsecutorialDiscretion,
supranote 5, at 458-59.
Professor Frase reports similar developments in France: French prosecutors have
considerable discretion to adjust or drop charges, but at the same time, their discretion "is
significantly more restraied ...than in the United States." Frase, supra note 3, at 611.
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prosecutors to "play it safe" in close cases and file criminal charges. 25
Secondly, a decision not to prosecute someone with a crime will have to face
review by prosecutorial superiors who tend to be conservative in matters of
discretion not to prosecute. 26 And, finally, if a prosecutor decides not to file
criminal charges because the prosecutor believes that the evidence in the case is
insufficient to support the filing of criminal charges, civil law systems usually
afford victims the right to challenge such decisions unless the crime involved is
rather minor. 27 Sometimes this challenge is administrative in the form of a
complaint about the prosecutor's actions, 2 8 but sometimes the victim's
challenge can be brought directly in court seeking reversal of the decision not
to prosecute29 or even through a form of private prosecution. 30 If review of the
prosecutor's decision reveals a violation of the duty of compulsory prosecution,
this would be entered in the prosecutor's file and could have a negative impact
on the speed with which the prosecutor advances up the hierarchical career path
31
typical of civil law systems.
If criminal charges are filed, the dossier in the case, which can be freely
reviewed by the defendant and his counsel, is sent to the trial judge who will
conduct the trial in the case. The civil law prosecutor's function at trial
diverges sharply from the American counterpart: the trial in the civil law
tradition is not an adversary proceeding, but it is an inquisitorial trial in which
the judge, rather than the parties, is responsible for developing the facts at
trial.3 2 Because the judge has an obligation in the civil law model to determine
25 See Damaka, supra note 11, at 131.
26
27

Id.at 137.
Herrmann, The Rule of Compulsory Prosecution,supra note 8, at 476-77.

28 See Langbein, Controlling Prosecutorial Discretion, supra note 5, at 463-64
(describing the right of a citizen to challenge through a departmental complaint a
prosecutor's decision not to prosecute); see also Herrmann, The Rule of Compulsory
Prosecution, supranote 8, at 476-77.
29 For a discussion of the power, in the Italian system, of the victim or the victim's
family to challenge actions of the prosecutor and to participate in the criminal process, see
Pizzi & Marafioti, supra note 7, at 14.
30
1augbein, ControllingProsecutorialDiscretion, supranote 5, at 441-42 (describing
the French system in which victims or those acting for the victim may sometimes institute

criminal charges on their own).
31 See Herrmann, The Rule of Compulsory Prosecution, supra note 8, at 476;
Langbein, Land Without Plea Bargaining,supra note 2, at 211.
32
In terms of the evolution of social systems away from systems of private vengeance,
the accusatorial system is sometimes viewed as a preliminary step to the inquisitorial
system. MERRYMAN, supra note 4, at 126-27. From the system of private vengeance, the
right of accusation comes to be vested in a prosecutorial figure, who represents all citizens
in making the accusation. Id. The trial takes place in front of a judicial figure who will hear
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whether or not the defendant is guilty, it is the judge, using the dossier of the
case, who will decide which witnesses will testify and who will conduct the
bulk of the questioning of those witnesses during the trial. 33 The involvement
of the prosecutor and the defense attorney at trial is generally limited to asking
a few follow-up questions or perhaps tactfully suggesting other lines of inquiry
to be pursued with the witnesses.
Because the judge in the civil law system has studied the dossier prior to
trial, there is the danger that the judge will have prejudged the case and will not
be open to rethinking the case after trial. The civil law system tries to protect
against this danger in several ways. First, in all but the most minor cases, the
civil law system prefers to use a panel of judges at trial and only one of the
judges will have studied the file in advance of trial. 34 This collegial approach
counterbalances at least some of the inherent dangers of the inquisitorial
system. A second check on the inquisitorial power of the trial judge is the trial
court's obligation to explain fully the conclusions that are reached following
trial. In contrast to the American system, a civil law trial does not result in a
simple verdict of guilty or not guilty. Instead, judges announce their decision
35
and give a general explanation of the reasons why they reached the verdict.
The court is then required within an interval of several weeks to issue a written
judgment which is the authoritative account of the reasons why the court
reached the verdict and sentence in question. 36 The written judgment is
prepared by the professional judges and it (1) summarizes the charges and the
evidence developed at trial, (2) explains any legal issues raised at trial and how
they were resolved by the court, (3) indicates the factual and legal conclusions
reached by the court and why the court reached those conclusions, and (4) if
the defendant is found guilty, indicates the sentence that court has imposed and
why it decided on that sentence. 37 Consistent with the hierarchical model, any
aspect of the judgment reached by the trial court is fully appealable by the
prosecution or the defense-legal conclusions, factual conclusions, or even the
38
sentence.
the evidence and decide the case, but who has no inherent powers of investigation. Id. In
the inquisitorial system the judge is converted from an impartial referee into an active
inquisitor who is free to seek evidence and to control the nature and objectives of the

inquiry.
Id.
33
34

131.

35
36

37
38

See LANGBEIN, GERMANY, supra note 2, at 62-64.

See LANGBEIN, GERMANY, supra note 2, at 62-63; MERRYMAN, supra note 4, at
LANGBEIN, GERMANY, supranote 2, at 56-58.
Id. at 56.

For an outline of a written judgment, see id. at 39-56.
Id. at 82-85.
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Two important cautionary notes need to be added to this brief overview of
criminal procedure within the civil law tradition. The first is that it is a very
sketchy account. Those wanting to understand the civil law system in more
depth would be well advised to read John Merryman's excellent introduction to
the civil law tradition39 or Mhjan Damaska's powerful monograph on the
relationship between structures of procedural authority and state power.40
Secondly, the reader should be aware that "describing" what happens in
civil law systems is not easy. One reason for the difficulty is the fact that civil
law systems are undergoing rapid changes that would have seemed unthinkable
a decade ago, thus making any description of European systems necessarily
somewhat tentative. One has only to consider plea bargaining to see how
sweeping the changes have been. At one time plea bargaining was considered
impossible to contemplate in a civil law country because it undercuts the
judge's obligation to determine the truth about the chprges (whether or not the
defendant confesses to the crime), and also because plea bargaining has the
potential to introduce disuniformities between defendants charged with the
same crime. As recently as 1979, John Langbein reported admiringly that the
German system has "successfully avoided any form or analogue of plea
bargaining in its proceduresfor cases of serious crimes."41 And, in 1980,
Thomas Weigend, a German comparative law scholar, reported that plea
bargaining in Germany and France is "virtually nonexistent." 42 He explained
that "the very idea of commercialized justice is abhorrent (at best, exotic) to
German legal tradition and theory." 43 But forms of plea bargaining-usually
between the judge and defense counsel-have emerged in Germany. Such plea
bargaining has become a problem" that is defended by practitioners 45 and
condemned by scholars.46
39

See generallyMERRYMAN, supranote 4.
40 See generally DAMA§KA,supra note 11.
41
Langbein, Land WIthout PleaBargaining, supra note 2, at 205.
42
Weigend, supranote 8, at 386.

43 Id. at 415.
44 The estimate is that plea bargaining affects about 20-30% of all trials in Germany.
Joachim Herrnann, Bargaining Justice - A Bargainfor German CinninalJustice?, 53 U.
Prrr. L. REV.755, 756 (1992); see also Thomas Weigend, Abgesprochene Gerechrigkeit Effi'enzdurch Kooperation im Stravetfahern?, 45 OsTEECIsCHE JURISTEN-ZErrUNG

[JZ] 774 (1990).
45

See Herrmann, supranote 44, at 766.
46 See id. (describing the debates that took place on plea bargaining at the prominent
bi-annual German conference, DewscherJuristentag);Bernd Schfinemann, Absprachen im
Straverfahren? Grundlagen, Gegenstonde und Grenzen, 1 VERHANDLUNGEN DES
AcHTUNDFONFZIGSTENDEUTSCHENJURISTENTAGES, B 9 (1990).
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Another reason for the difficulty in describing a subject such as
prosecutorial discretion as it exists in a civil law country is that people may
"see" different things even in the same country. (The cartoon with which this
Article began reminds us that seeing is not a passive activity.) In the late 1970's
Abraham Goldstein and Martin Marcus challenged much of the prior
scholarship claiming that there was an enormous gap between theory and
practice in civil law countries and that judicial supervision of prosecutors was a
"myth." 47 There have been vigorous responses to that article, challenging both
48
the research of Goldstein and Marcus and their conclusions.
Obviously, the extent that civil law countries may have had to relax
traditional restraints on prosecutorial discretion 49 seems to suggest that the
broad prosecutorial discretion that exists in this country is not quite the
anomaly its critics make it out to be. But this Article takes no position on the
Goldstein and Marcus debate. The subject of this Article is the American
prosecutor. The civil law model is used as a contrast showing that tight judicial
control over prosecutorial discretion on the civil law model-whatever its
reality in various countries on the continent-would be unworkable in the
United States.
III. UNDERSTANDING THE AMERICAN PROSECUTOR

A. The American Prosecutoras an Elected Public Official
The starting premise from which all proposals to reform the American
prosecutor seem to begin is the worry that American prosecutors, because they
possess "virtually unlimited control over charging" 50 are nearly omnipotent s I
within our system of criminal procedure. Instead of accepting that such power
conveys with it responsibilities, prosecutors are pictured as clinging fiercely to
their discretionary power, unwilling to contemplate any structures for

47

See Goldstein & Marcus, Myth ofJudicial Supervision, supranote 11.
48 See supra note 11; see also Damalka, supranote 11, at 131 (warning that a surface
parallelism in the way cases are disposed of by prosecutors in Germany and the United
States is not inconsistent with vast divergences in what prosecutors are actually doing).
49
See Luca Marafioti, L'Archiviazjone Tra Crisi Del Dogma Di Obbligatorieth
Delll Aone ed Opportunit "DiFatto," 1992 CASSAZiONE PENALE 206 (describing how the

principal of compulsory prosecution and tight judicial supervision of prosecutorial discretion
has had to give way in practice in civil law countries pressed by the reality of modem case
loads).
50
See Vorenberg, supranote 15, at 1525.
51 See Langbein, ControllingProsecutorialDiscretion,supra note 5, at 440.
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exercising discretion that would limit their freedom of action in a significant
52

way.
In terms of the formal controls over prosecutorial discretion, it is certainly
true that American prosecutors have far more discretion than their continental
counterparts. If an American prosecutor decides not to file a criminal charge,
there usually is no mechanism that would permit judicial review of that
decision53 and, even when there is a statute permitting review, judicial
approval is given perfunctorily. 54 Thus prosecutors have tremendous discretion
in deciding whether to charge someone with a crime, even when the evidence is
strong. Professor Davis asks:
Why should the vital decisions [the prosecutor] makes be immune to
review by other officials and immune to review by the courts, even though
our legal and governmental system elsewhere generally a:sumes the need
for checking human frailties? Why should he have a complete power to
decide that one statute duly enacted by the people's representatives shall not
be enforced at all, that another statute will be fully enforced, and that a
third will be enforced only if, as, and when he thinks that it should be
55
enforced in a particular case?

These questions make the American system of broad prosecutorial discretion
seem arbitrary and haphazard.
But it is characteristic of the American legal system that it often prefers
controls on officials that are indirect and informal rather than the sort of
formal, hierarchical controls that civil law systems prefer. 56 Because the
52

See Vorenberg, supra note 15, at 1564-65.
53 2 WAYNE R. LAFAVE & JEROLD H. ISRAEL, CRdMINAL PROCEDURE § 13.3, at 181

(1984).
54 Id.
One reason that such judicial review is granted perfunctorily even under such statutes
permitting review of a decision not to charge is that such statutes are not intended to limit
broad prosecutorial discretion, but are only intended to prevent action that is so arbitrary
and capricious that it cannot be defended as an exercise of discretion. See, e.g., COLO. REV.
STAT. § 16-5-209 (1986) (stating that the judge may order prosecution only when failure to
file charges was "arbitrary or capricious and without reasonable excuse").
55 See DAVIS, DISCRETIONARYJUSTICE, supra note 8, at 189.

56 In his famous article on structures of authority in comparative criminal procedure,
Professor Mijan Dama§k contrasts the hierarchical model of authority, characteristic of
continental systems of procedure, with the coordinate model of authority, which is the
structure of authority typified by Anglo-American systems of criminal procedure. See
Darmaka, supra note 23. The hierarchical model places great emphasis on the certainty of
decisionmaking and any consideration of individual circumstances must be subordinated to
the goal of ensuring the certainty of the system's decisionmaking. Id. at 483-87. In contrast,
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controls on prosecutorial power are not immediately visible, it is easy to
overlook and underestimate the controls that do exist over American
prosecutorial discretion. The main difference between American prosecutors
and their European counterparts is the fact that American prosecutors are
almost always elected public officials 57 who have to defend their record and the
way that they use their discretion to the electorate. Obviously, this fact means
that prosecutorial decisions in the United States are "susceptible to political
influences," 58 as critics of American prosecutorial discretion worry. There are
positive and negative aspects to political pressures, however, and it is typical of
the American political tradition-in which state power is not viewed with the
same trust that it is in civil law countries59-to come down in favor of political
control over public officials, rather than preferring internal hierarchical controls
over public officials.
Professor Davis questions whether a system of electing local prosecutors is
consistent "with a sound system of discretionary justice. "60 He is attracted to
the idea of shifting state prosecutorial authority from local prosecutors to the
state attorney generals, who, he recognizes, 6 1 have not traditionally had an
important role to play in the enforcement of criminal law. 62 But the preference
for political control over public officials runs deep in the American political
tradition, especially in rural areas where populism remains a potent force. Not
only are ninety-seven percent of our state prosecutors elected, 63 but many
judges are elected as well. One only has to observe the battles that have taken
place over judicial reform in states such as Ohio and Texas to get some idea of
how difficult it would be to divorce prosecutorial power from political control.
Ohio has tried on four occasions to reform its judicial system by moving the
system away from the partisan election of judges and replacing that system with
a merit selection process. 64 The last attempt lost by a two to one margin despite
the mentality behind the coordinate model of authority is somewhat skeptical of attempts to
impress general structures on the complexities of life and is far more willing to try to
accommodate the equities of the situation in order to reach a decision that is just. Id. at 50911.
57 Telephone interview with Mark C. Faull, Senior Attorney, American Prosecutors
Research Institute (Apr. 29, 1992).
58 See Vorenberg, supra note 15, at 1558.
59
See WEINREB, supranote 3, at 12.
60
See DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE, supra note 8, at 208.
61 Id. One state that has such a centralized prosecutorial structure is Alaska. See Frase,
supra
note 3, at 560 n.84.
62
See2 LAFAVi & IRAEL, supra note 53, § 13.2, at 173.
63
See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
64
See John D. Felice & John C. Kilwein, Stike One, Stike Two...: the History of
and Prospectfor Judicial Reform in Ohio, 75 JUDICATURE 193, 194 (1992).
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endorsement of the reform by the Ohio Bar Association and the Ohio League
of Women Voters. 65 In Texas, where the partisan election of judges has
directly affected the development of tort law in that state66 and where campaign
contributions totaling over four and one-half million dollars were spent in the
1986 elections for four seats on the state supreme court, 67 proposals for reform
have gone nowhere. 68 Any reform of prosecutorial power that would divorce
the office of prosecutor from political control by the electorate is likely to be
seen as a diminution of voters' rights, making passage very unlikely.
When the political nature of the office of prosecutor is taken into account,
Professor Davis's concerns seem less serious: If someone is to decide which
laws will be aggressively enforced, which laws will be enforced occasionally,
and which laws will never be enforced, it makes sense that the person who has
69
to answer to the voters will make those determinations.
As to the need for deciding which laws will be "aggressively enforced"
and which will be "occasionally enforced," the nature of substantive criminal
law seems to demand more of these decisions from American prosecutors.
Because the civil law tradition emphasizes codes so strongly, the overall
structure of the criminal code and the way various statutory norms relate to one
another get more attention in those countries. The feeling in civil law countries
is that if the administration of the penal code produces undesired consequences,
it should be amended rather than permitting the prosecutor to alter enforcement
policies to produce more desirable consequences. 70 By contrast, criminal law
provisions in most American jurisdictions tend to be a patchwork of statutory
norms, 7' leading sometimes to inconsistencies that may call for the exercise of
discretion on the part of prosecutors when they arise.

65 Id. at 193.
66

See Christi Harlan, Texas Suprere Court Race pits Lmyers Against Business

Interest, WALL ST. I., Nov. 2, 1992, at 34. The incumbent was heavily supported in his

campaign by plaintiffs' lawyers, while business interests and the defense bar supported the
challenger. Id.
67

See Anthony Champagne, Judicdal Refonn in Texas, 72 JUDICATURE 146, 149

(1988).

68

Id. at 158-59.

69 "On numerous occasions, we have explained that in general the district attorney is

answerable to the people of the state and not to the courts or the legislature as to the manner
in which he or she exercises prosecutorial discretion." State v. Annala, 484 N.W.2d 138,
146 (Wis. 1992).
70
See Herrmann, The Rule of Compulsory Prosecution, supra note 8, at 470.
71 Damaka, supra note 11, at 129 (explaining that the "overlapping statutes" of the
American system force the prosecutor to "correct over-reaching penal statutes in the
U.S.").
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Another reason that prosecutors seem to need more discretion in the United
States is the comparative severity of the penalties imposed on criminals when
compared to the those imposed for the same crimes on the continent. 72
Whether it is today, or was ever accurate to say, as was said in 1966, that a
month in prison on the continent was the equivalent of a one year sentence to
prison in the United States, 73 it seems to be generally recognized that the
penalties imposed on those convicted of the same crimes are harsher in the
74
United States.
The relationship between harshness and prosecutorial discretion is a
complicated one. Whether the comparative harshness of criminal sentences in
the United States is a cause of broad prosecutorial discretion or an effect of
such prosecutorial discretion is an interesting question. Whatever the exact
relationship, there are too many crimes that carry harsh mandatory minimum
sentences in the wake of conviction. 75 Professor Vorenberg challenges the
notion that harshness is a justification for prosecutorial discretion. He argues
that prosecutors who overrule the legislature's judgment by dispensing mercy
in the face of harsh sentences are increasing their own power and making it
more likely that they will use such statutes for plea bargaining. He maintains
that: "If we are truly concerned about compassion, we are less likely to achieve
it through the hidden and unpredictable use of prosecutorial discretion than
through encouraging the legislature to see and respond to the results of archaic
or overly harsh laws." 76
To some extent it may be the case that prosecutorial discretion encourages
harsh laws. As long as the legislature knows that prosecutors will use their
72

Herrmann, The Rule of Compulsory Prosecution,supra note 8, at 473.

73

Ld. (citing Zeisel, Die Rolle der Geschworen in den USA, 21 JZ 121, 123 (1966)).

74 Id. at 473-74. Professor Frase studied French sentence statistics and concluded that
French sentences seem to be more lenient than those in the United States, but his answer is

qualified and he suggests more study needs to be done as the statistics are difficult to
compare. See Frase, supra note 3, at 648-58.
75
See generally Gary T. Lowenthal, Mandatory Sentencing Laws: Undemining the
Effectiveness ofDeterinateSentencing Reform, 81 CAL. L. REv. 61 (1993).
There are many complaints about the terrible injustices produced in federal courts by
mandatory minimum sentences and repeated calls for congressional repeal of such laws.
See, e.g., Hon. Gerald W. Heaney, Revisiting Disparity:Debating Guidelines Sentencing,

29 AM. CIuM. L. REV. 771, 786 (1992); Stephen J. Schulhofer, Assessing the Federal
Sentencing Process:The Problem Is Uniformity, Not Disparity,29 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 833,

851-52 (1992); Stuart Taylor, Jr., JanetReno's Test of Courage, AM. LAw., Sept. 1993, at
34.
For a moving account of one such injustice, see Michael Winerip, Tend a Garden, Pay

the Price:A Legal Story, N.Y. TIMs, July 12, 1992, at 25.
76 Vorenberg, supra note 15, at 1552.
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discretion to see that only "real" drug dealers get the harsh ten year mandatory
minimum set out in the statute, there is political gain for the legislature in
showing the electorate that it is "tough on crime." Whether most legislatures
would "respond" appropriately, however, as Professor Vorenberg suggests,
and soften "overly harsh laws" if they saw that the "results" of such laws were
numerous young drug offenders going to jail for ten years seems quite a
gamble in a country in which citizens are worried about crime," 77 and are often
angry at the criminal justice system, 78 and in which elected officials of all
stripes want to appear to be responding to their concerns. 79 Obviously,
Europeans are concerned about crime, too,80 but issues surrounding crime and
the criminal justice system are not nearly as politicalized as they are in the
United States. To get some idea of the different political climate regarding
crime that exists in Europe (where there is no death penalty), consider the
policy on drugs in the Netherlands, which has been to decriminalize the use
and small scale trade in soft drugs (cannabis and hashish).8 ' What is instructive
is not so much the drug policy as much as the fact that this policy is not a
political issue and politicians can see no gain to be made in sounding a strong
antidrug theme in that country. 82 By contrast, both U.S. presidential candidates
in 1992 took pains to explain to voters just how tough on drugs they were,
77

A Justice Department survey asked respondents if they felt that the crime rate in

their area has been increasing, decreasing, or has remained the same. Fifty-five percent said
they felt that crime was increasing, thirty-nine percent said it was the same, and only five
percent said it was decreasing. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL

JUSTICESTATIscs-1990, 184 tbl. 2.36 (1991).
78 When asked the level of confidence they had in the ability of courts "to convict and
properly sentence criminals," 59% of those questioned in a Justice Department survey
answered, "Not very much." Id. at 161 thl. 2.10, see also WEINREB, supra note 3, at 4.
Recently, the American Bar Association (ABA) released the results of a poll it
commissioned to determine the public's perception of lawyers. Gary A. Hengstler, Vox
Populi: The Public Perceptionof Lawyers: ABA Poll, A.B.A. J., Sept. 1993, at 60. When
the public was asked what changes should be made to improve the profession, one of the
leading responses was to toughen the criminal justice system, including sentences. Id. at 64.
79

See, e.g., Andrew Rosenthal, Cwnpaign Tactics Provoke New Charges, N.Y.

TIMEs, Oct. 31, 1988, at B6; Robin Toner, Prison Furloughs in Massachusetts Threaten
Dukakis Record on Crime, N.Y. TIMES, July 5, 1988, atB6.
80
The rate of crime, especially violent crime, seems to be significantly lower in
Europe. See generally Gunther Arzt, Responses to the Growth of Crime in the United States

and West Germany:A Comparison of the Changes in CriminalLaw and Societal Attitudes,

12 CORNELL INT'LL.L 43 (1979).
81 See Ed Leuw, Drugs and Drug Policy in the Netherlands, 14 CRIME & JUST. 229

(1991).
82

Id.at 251-53.
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with both candidates going so far as to advocate the death penalty for drug
"kingpins." 83 Admittedly, this is only one example and the Netherlands is
recognized as a very liberal country even by other European countries, but as
this subpart has explained, the politicalization of criminal justice issues in the
United States has its roots in a tradition that prefers for its citizens to have
direct political control over prosecutors.
B. The American Prosecutoras a Local Official
Part of the background to the civil law tradition of compulsory prosecution
stems from the concern that broad prosecutorial discretion would lead
inevitably to local differences in the enforcement of the criminal law. 84 But
prosecutorial discretion in the American legal system must be seen as part of a
political tradition that is built on a preference for local control over political
power and on an aversion to strong centralized governmental authority and
power. 85 There is no better example than our federal system in which each
state retains the power to make its own criminal laws and even to determine its
own system of criminal procedure, consistent with the U.S. Constitution. This
aversion to strong centralized governmental power runs deep in the American
political tradition. 86 It is not an accident that in the United States, in strong
contrast with European countries, something as important as education remains
not a state matter, but a local matter, and different localities may adhere to
quite different educational philosophies and objectives.
Some may see a counterexample to the political tradition just described
because each of the United States Attorneys in the U.S. Department of Justice,
for each of the ninety-four districts, are appointed by the President and serve
under the U.S. Attorney General. But even in this structure which seems to
mirror civil law arrangements, one can see the powerful pull of the American
political ideology in that even within this centralized structure it has always
been accepted that each United States Attorney has considerable discretion in
determining the prosecutorial policies and the enforcement priorities for that
particular office. Professor Vorenberg, in his article calling for major reforms
aimed at curtailing prosecutorial discretion, complained about the failure of the
U.S. Department of Justice to adopt guidelines for charging, plea bargaining,
and sentencing that would have tied prosecutorial power nationwide to a fixed
83

See Joseph B. Treaster, Canddates Seek Little Change in Ani-drug Effort, N.Y.

TIMES, Oct. 22, 1992, at A22.
84
1d.
85 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, 1 DEMOCRACY INAMERICA 346-47 (Henry Reeve trans.,

Cambridge,
University Press 2d ed. 1863).
86

GRANT McCONNLL,PRIVATE PownR ANAAEuIcAN DEMocRAcY 5 (1966).
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set of standards. 87 That we can draft a single set of standards for the
enforcement of federal criminal laws that will work as well in Miami 88 as they
do in Boise is not self-evident. But more important than the wisdom and
practicality of national standards and guidelines is the failure to appreciate how
much the proposal clashes with our political preference for local control over
prosecutorial power. Whatever structural similarity there may be between a
United States Attorney and the head of a similar unit in a civil law country, one
can rest assured that these two officials think about their job very differently
and they approach individual cases very differently.8 9
Typically, prosecutors or "district attorneys" run for office on a county or
district basis and each district attorney is free to set policies for that office that
take into account the available prosecutorial resources, as well as local crime
concerns and priorities. Local units of government, such as counties, will
usually not be as diverse in terms of the political values represented within
those units as would be the case if the political unit were larger. 90 Such local
units of government may thus have different objectives and priorities which
may reflect differences in values, differences in the amount of resources that
87

Vorenberg, supra note 15, at 1543-44.
Kenneth Noto, the Deputy Chief of the Narcotics Section at the United States
Attorney's Office for the Southern District of Florida, stated that his office declines to
prosecute drug cases when the amount of cocaine is viewed as too small even though the
same cases would be viewed as "significant" drug cases by most other federal offices.
Telephone Interview with Kenneth Note, Deputy Chief of the Narcotics Section, U.S.
Attorney's Office for the Southern District of Florida, (Aug. 31, 1993). He refused to
divulge what the exact limit is in terms of the amount of drugs at which such cases are
declined. Id. He stated that the office would not want such policy known to the public for
fear that drug smugglers would break shipments into packages sufficient to get under the
limit and thereby try to avoid federal prosecution. Id.
89 Professor Dama!ka writes:
88

The head of a local German prosecutorial office should not be identified with the
American chief prosecutor of a local jurisdiction. Even where the latter is not
locally elected, he tends to be much more fiercely independent of superior
authority and much more inclined to regard problems in his work as requiring
compromise, bargaining and creative choice than is the case with his German
colleague. The latter seems by comparison almost ascetic in his refusal to boldly
confront policy considerations; narrowly technical, he tends to seek and try to
discover "correct solutions" in terms of professional standards.
Damalka, supra note 11, at 137.
90 See Edward W. Weidner, Decision-Making in a Federal System, in FEDERALISM
MATuE AND EMERGENT 363, 366-67 (Andrew W. MacMahon ed. 1955).
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are available, or other local problems. 91 In a state jurisdiction in which
prosecutors usually run for office on a county-wide basis, are funded on the
same local basis, and must work with juries drawn from the local population, it
is almost guaranteed that prosecutors who are elected in highly rural counties
will have quite different constituencies and will face very different criminal
problems from those prosecutors elected in heavily urban counties. 92 Partly
because of differences in resources, and partly because of differences in
enforcement philosophies and priorities, it will often be the case that two
prosecutorial offices in the same state will treat the possession of a small
amount of cocaine, a first time property offense, or drunk driving differently.
This means that the same criminal laws may be enforced differently within a
single state. In short, a certain disuniformity in the enforcement of the same
criminal laws is built into the political structure in which American prosecutors
operate.
C. Informal Guidelines and Standardswithin Prosecutors' Offices
Obviously, the indirect political controls that exist over American
prosecutors are not the equivalent of the sort of direct hierarchical review of
prosecutorial decisions that exist in civil law systems. But the political controls
are not meaningless either, especially in a society that is very worried about
crime. Normally, a prosecutor who wishes to be reelected has a strong
incentive to run a professional office which entails that charging decisions are
made fairly and that assistants in that office are consistent with each other in
how they charge similar crimes and how they plea bargain similar cases.
Today, it is important for prosecutors to have good relationships with victims,
the police, judges, and the general public. This means, for example, that it
usually makes sense for assistant prosecutors to spend some time explaining.
their decisions to those concerned with a particular case so that they do not feel
ignored by the system and they understand what action the prosecutor took and
why.
How a prosecutor prefers to run the office may vary considerably from
office to office and may depend on many factors, such as the size of the office,
the volume of criminal cases, the level of experience and "turnover" rate of the
assistants in that office, as well as the style of the prosecutor. There is no one
formula that describes the administrative structure of a high quality
prosecutor's office. Some prosecutors may prefer to give assistant prosecutors
91 See MCCONNELL, supra note 86, at 117-18.
92 The acquittal rate after trial in the District of Columbia is nearly double the national

average. Jeff Rosen, Jurymandering, THE Nmv REPUBLIC, Nov. 30, 1992, at 15, 15-16.
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considerable discretion for handling minor cases, while others may prefer to
control the handling of high-volume, minor cases through a set of internal
guidelines, policies, or paradigm cases. 93 Normally, however, each office will
have some informal system of internal controls so that less experienced
prosecutors are supervised to some degree by more experienced prosecutors
through a system of guidelines or internal office policies, through a system of
direct review of charging decisions, or a combination of the tWO. 9 4 A scandal
in the way prosecutorial power is exercised within the office could hurt the
prosecutor's chances of re-election; thus internal controls over prosecutorial
discretion aimed at assuring both fairness and consistency have obvious
political advantages.
Another very practical reason a prosecutor's office will usually find it wise
to have some system of informal controls over charging decisions and plea
bargaining decisions is to ensure that similar cases are handled in a similar
way. In any jurisdiction with a high volume of criminal cases, (an increasing
phenomena), it is much easier to process and resolve cases efficiently and
expeditiously when everyone in the process-including not only assistant
prosecutors, but also defense lawyers and judges-understands what the general
policies of the prosecutor's office are with respect to routine criminal cases. It
is difficult for a conscientious defense attorney to counsel a defendant on the
advantages or disadvantages of a particular plea bargain offer if there remains
the possibility that the offer will be sweetened later in the process. Thus, it is
usually the case that from both an ethical as well as a pragmatic viewpoint, it is
wise for a prosecutor's office to have informal controls that ensure that
charging and plea bargaining are generally consistent within that office.

93 David Heilbroner has written an interesting account of his three-year stint as an

assistant district attorney in the Manhattan District Attorney's Office. DAvID HEILBRONER,
ROUGH JUSTICE (1990). Even in such a busy office, the overall impression one gets from the
book is that assistant district attorneys had considerable discretion over how they handled
minor criminal cases, with some assistants taking a much more aggressive posture than
others.
94
See infra Part VI, for a detailed description of a set of guidelines that were in place
in the Manhattan District Attorney's Office while Richard Kuh was the District Attorney. In
general, one might describe them as a system of guidelines that permits controlled discretion
on the part of assistants in that office, but that also permits assistants to plea bargain cases in
ways that are inconsistent with the general guidelines with approval of a bureau chief. See
generally Richard H. Kuh, Plea Bargaining: Guidelines for the Manhattan District
Attorney's Office, 11 CRiM. L. BULL. 48 (1975) (reproducing an internal office
memorandum on plea bargaining).

1346

OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 54:1325

D. Value Differences Between the Civil Law Traditionand the American
Adversary Tradition
The sorts of internal controls described in the previous subpart are
important, but they are usually informal and certainly do not guarantee that
similar cases will always be handled similarly within that office. This is a
major concern of critics of American prosecutorial discretion who push for
strict judicial control over prosecutorial discretion, such as the judicial control
characteristic of the civil law system. The topic of guidelines aimed at
controlling prosecutorial discretion is discussed later in this Article. 95 But
before that subject is explored, it is important to recognize a value difference
between the American criminal justice system and European systems of justice
concerning the importance to be attached to uniform treatment of offenders
under the same penal statutes. In the ideology of civil law systems, uniformity
is near the top of the values emphasized by those systems. 96 In the ideology of
the American legal system, however, uniformity has a lower priority. One can
see this different emphasis on uniformity at many points of comparison
between the two systems. One obvious example of the different priorities that
the two systems place on uniformity is evident in the way civil law systems and
the American legal system treat decisions at the end of criminal trials. In civil
law systems an acquittal or a conviction is fully appealable. 97 In the United
States, however, an acquittal may never be appealed 98 and even a finding of
guilt cannot be directly challenged on appeal. It is an accepted consequence of
our jury system that two juries could reach opposite conclusions on virtually
identical evidenceP9-something that would be unacceptable in a civil law
system. The American legal system prefers to accept such disuniformities' 00
95 See discussion infra Part VI, which explains why guidelines need to be flexible and
informal and why guidelines are oversold as a remedy for limiting prosecutorial discretion.
96 Damalka, supra note 23, at 483-84.
97
LANGBEIN, GERMANY, supra note 2, at 82-84; MERRYMAN, supra note 4, at 120.
98
See Sanabria v. United States, 437 U.S. 54, 75 (1978) (holding that there is no
exception to double jeopardy permitting retrial after an acquittal, no matter how egregiously
erroneous the legal rulings were that led to the acquittal).
99 In Standefer v. United States, the Court refused to give preclusive effect to an
acquittal of a codefendant: "This case does no more than manifest the simple, if
discomforting reality that 'different juries may reach different results under any criminal
statute. That is one of the consequences we accept under our jury system.'" Standefer v.
United States, 447 U.S. 10, 25 (1980) (quoting Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 492
n.30 (1957)).
100 An example of such a disuniformity is the Rodney King case, in which the four
defendants were acquitted in state court on police brutality charges and were then tried in
federal court for the same conduct under civil rights statutes, with the second jury
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rather than subject jury verdicts to official scrutiny and the pressures that such
scrutiny may entail.101
Someone trained in a European legal system may find variations in the way
that local prosecutors in different parts of the state enforce violations of the
same criminal statute to be intolerable. But the American legal system has a
much greater tolerance for these sorts of variations, as long as they are reached
in good faith. It is well to remember that all nonpetty offenses in the United
States must ultimately be tried to a jury which is composed of local citizens
who bring their own values into the jury box. Prosecutors must work within a
jury system in which citizens will have the final word on the guilt of the
defendant and juries may vary in their background and attitudes within the
same state. 102
The American legal system's open recognition of jury nullification is
another example of that system's willingness to tolerate differences in the
enforcement of substantive criminal law that would not be permitted under the
civil law tradition. It has long been understood that juries do not always apply
the letter of the law to the defendant. The famous Kalven and Zeisel study on
juries showed that juries sometimes acquit defendants for reasons such as the
following: (1) they sympathize with the defendant as a person, (2) they take
into account the contributory fault of the victim, (3) they believe the offense is
de minimis, (4) they take into account the fact that the statute violated is an
unpopular law, (5) they feel the defendant has already been punished enough,
or (6) they believe the offense is accepted conduct in the subculture of the
defendant and the victim.10 3 Far from a reason to criticize the institution of the
jury, this ability of a jury to "reshape" or "modify" the law to fit its own
conception of fairness was singled out by the U.S. Supreme Court as one
reason in support of its decision to extend the right to jury trials to the
states. 104

This willingness to accept the inherent power of juries to modify the
statutory law to reflect the equities of the individual case clashes with the heavy
convicting two of the defendants. See John Riley, A Near-PerfectCase, NEWSDAY, Apr. 18,
1992, at 4.
101 Generally, special verdicts or questions to the jury are viewed with suspicion in
criminal cases because it is thought that such questions undermine the independence of the
jury. Heald v. Mullaney, 505 F.2d 1241, 1245 (1st Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 955

(1975).
10 2

See FRANK W. MILLER, PROSECUTION: THE DECISION TO CHARGE A SUSPECT WrTH

ACRIME 43 (1970); John Kaplan, The ProsecutorialDiscretion-A Cormnt, 60 Nw. U. L.
REv. 10174,
180 (1965).
3
HARRYKALVEN, JR. & I-TANs ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY, chs. 15-27 (1966).
10 4
See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 156-58 (1968).
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emphasis that the civil law tradition places on uniformity and verdicts that are
fully explicable under applicable law. The subtheme of this Article concerns the
difficulties of stepping outside one's political heritage and legal tradition in
attempting to reform the American prosecutor. This underlying theme has a
historical analog in the attempt of the French, in the aftermath of the French
revolution, to introduce onto the continent the institution of the jury that
seemed to work so well across the channel. 10 5 The institution of lay juries
never took hold on the continent because it was inconsistent with civil law
values.1l 6
The emphasis that the American legal system places on the equities of the
individual case is embodied not only in the institution of the jury, but in the
common law tradition itself. I the common law tradition, law develops and
evolves case by case, with a strong emphasis on making each case come out
correctly. By contrast, European systems do not evolve, rather they are
constructed in detailed codes which embody an ideology about the written law
that has no counterpart in the common law tradition.10 7 There is in the civil
law tradition a respect, maybe even a reverence, for the written law and what it
embodies that is not shared by the common law tradition.' 0 8 This background
helps explain why the civil law tradition would have difficulty investing
prosecutors with the sort of broad discretion that has come to characterize the
position of prosecutor in the United States. l0 9 Civil law prosecutors, when
confronted with a difficult charging decision see themselves not as making a
discretionary decision, but rather as making the same decision that other
prosecutors would make in that same situation. 110 They are likely to try to
explain the decision as correct under professional standards."' In short, they
see themselves more as administrators, exhibiting what Professor Damaska
describes as "traces of a career civil-service mentality. "112
When one understands the role of the prosecutor in the American political
tradition as well as the different attitudes and values reflected in the common
law tradition compared to the civil law tradition, it is not surprising that the
nature of prosecutorial power differs markedly in the two traditions and that the
105

See Ennio Amodio & Eugenio Selvaggi, An Accusarorial System in a Civil Law
County: The 1988 Italian Code of CridnalProcedure,62 TEMP. L. REv. 1211, 1211 n.1
(1989).
106 SeeDAMAkA, supra note 6, at 36; MERRYMAN, supra note 4, at 128.
107 See MERRYMAN, supranote 4, at 26-33.

108 Id.
109 See Damaka, supra note 11, at 124-31.
110
See id. at 137.
Ill Id.

112 Id.
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American criminal justice system has a much higher tolerance for the sorts of
disuniformities and inconsistencies that can occur even where prosecutors
exercise their discretion in complete good faith.
E. The Adversary System as Control on American Prosecutorial
Discretion
Besides the political controls over American prosecutorial power, there is
another important, albeit also indirect, control over prosecutorial discretion in
the United States that has no counterpart in the civil law tradition, namely, the
adversary system of trial. In the United States, the prosecutor is responsible for
conducting the trial and presenting evidence sufficient to convict the defendant
beyond a reasonable doubt. As this trial system has evolved, it has become
very sophisticated and complicated with the result that advocacy courses
devoted to developing courtroom skills in areas such as jury selection,
examining witnesses, cross-examining experts, and the use of demonstrative
evidence are standard at American law schools.
One result of the adversary system of trial is that American prosecutors are
forced to think about cases quite differently from prosecutors in civil law
systems. Trials in the United States are personalized to a very great extent.
Prosecutors and defense attorneys talk about the cases they've "won" and those
they've "lost." When a prosecutor obtains a conviction, she will be
congratulated by others in the office for the "victory" and when she "loses" a
case, she will often spend some time wondering what she might have done
differently to have changed the outcome and to have convinced the jury to
convict. 113 Prosecutors feel personally responsible for the outcome of their
cases, in part because the adversary system accepts the consequence that the
outcome of a trial may be a reflection of the quality of the advocacy. 14
Because jury trials require considerable preparation and are often rather
demanding, prosecutors generally do not want to file charges against a
defendant unless the chances of convicting the defendant are very good.' 15 This
will be especially true of the type of routine, rather minor criminal cases that
are the bread and butter of most prosecutors' offices. Thus, the adversary
system serves as a screen to discourage prosecutors from pursuing weak cases.
Those who suggest that judicial review of charging decisions is necessary
in the American criminal justice system because neither the grand jury nor
113
114

WEINREB, supranote 3, at 103.
See infra note 138.

115 See 2 LAFAVE& ISRAEL, supra note 53, § 13.1, at 157 ("As a practical matter, the
prosecutor is likely to require admissible evidence showing a high probability of guilt, that

is, sufficient evidence to justify confidence in obtaining a conviction.").
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preliminary hearings function to screen out weak cases,16 are correct in their
assessment of grand juries and preliminary hearings, in which the standard of
proof is usually only probable cause. Prosecutors rarely think in terms of
probable cause, however, when deciding whether to file formal charges. They
want evidence that will be sufficient to secure a conviction at trial before they
117
file formal charges.
The prosecutor in civil law systems focuses much less on the trial. The
prosecutor's main task is to make sure that the investigative file of the case, the
dossier, is complete in the sense that it contains all relevant inculpatory and
exculpatory evidence and all relevant information on the background of the
defendant. But the trial itself is the responsibility of the trial judge (or judges),
not the prosecutor.1 18 It is the judge, using the dossier, who will decide who
will testify and in what order the witnesses will be heard, and it is the judge
who controls the bulk of the questioning in an effort to determine whether the
defendant committed the crime. 119 To a large extent the prosecutor's work is
completed before the trial takes place and the prosecutor plays a relatively
minor role at trial.1 20 Thus, the sorts of adversary pressures that would counsel
caution in filing charges when the evidence is not strong are, if not absent, far
less important in the thinking of a civil law prosecutor. As long as there was
sufficient evidence to support the prosecution, the stigma attached to "losing a
case" is not present in the civil law system. 121
Further distinguishing European prosecutors from their American
counterparts is the historical tradition of compulsory prosecution in civil law
systems under which prosecutors were obliged to file criminal charges
122
whenever there was evidence that a citizen had committed a serious crime.
This tradition has been softened considerably over time' 23 and today it means
different things in different European countries. It is still fair to say, however,
that the safe course for a European prosecutor who has evidence that a crime
has been committed, but who also has serious doubts about whether a
116 Vorenberg, supra note 15, at 1537-38, 1547.
117
See MARviN E. FRANKEL & GARY P. NAFrALIS,

THE GRAND JURY: AN

INSTIrON ON TRiAL 25-26 (1977). See also supratext accompanying note 115.
118

Langbein, Land Without Plea Bargaining,supra note 2, at 217.

119

Langbein, ControllingProsecutorialDiscretion, supra note 5, at 448 ("Because the
law of evidence is uncomplicated and the proof-taking is largely conducted by the presiding
judge, the prosecutor cuts a peripheral figure at trial.").
120 LANGBEIN, GERMANY, supra note 2, at 64-65.
121 Darmnka, supra note 11, at 131.
12 2

Langbein, ControllingProsecutorialDiscretion,supra note 5, at 448-50.

123

Id. at 458-61; see also Herrmann, The Rule of Compulsory Prosecution, supra

note 8, at 480, 484; Weigend, supra note 8, at 400-04.
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conviction can be obtained, is to file charges in that case. 124 Free of the
political and adversary pressures under which American prosecutors work and
encouraged by tradition to put doubtful cases into the system, judicial review of
a prosecutor's charging decisions seems to fit comfortably into the civil law
tradition. That it does not square with our concept of a judge in the American
adversary tradition will be discussed in the next Part.
IV. THE AMmCAN JUDGE: CONCEPTUAL AND PRACTICAL PROBLEMS
RAISED BY JUDICIAL SUPERVISION OF PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION
The previous Part tried to show several of the influences and pressures on
the exercise of American prosecutorial discretion that make the charges that
American prosecutors have "unfettered" discretion in charging not quite as
startling as they might seem on the surface and that distinguish the American
prosecutor from civil law counterparts. This Part will look at the equation from
the other side and will consider what is being asked of the American judiciary
when it is proposed that the exercise of prosecutorial discretion should be
limited and that some of that discretion should be shifted to the judiciary.
The first problem that rears its head is the fact that judicial power in the
United States is far more limited in the American legal tradition than it is in
civil law systems. Put bluntly, except in the narrow band of cases where a
prosecutor's actions violates the Constitution, an American judge has no power
to reduce or reshape criminal charges to fit the evidence or the equities of a
particular case. 125 Professor Davis, while acknowledging the long line of
12 4 See Damanka, supra note 11, at 131; Herrmann, The Rule of Compulsory
Prosecution, supra note 8, at 475, 484; Langbein, Land Without Plea Bargaining, supra

note 2, at 211.
125 The United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit has made the following
observations on the limited role of the judiciary in reviewing prosecutorial discretion:
Few subjects are less adapted to judicial review than the exercise by the
Executive of his discretion in deciding when and whether to institute criminal
proceedings, or what precise charge shall be made, or whether to dismiss a
proceeding once brought.
...
...

[N]o court has any jurisdiction to inquire into or review his decision.
[W]hile this discretion is subject to abuse or misuse just as is judicial

discretion, deviations from his duty as an agent of the Executive are to be dealt
with by his superiors.
*.. [lit is not the function of the judiciary to review the exercise of executive
discretion whether it be that of the President himself or those to whom he has
delegated certain of his powers.
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decisions raising the principle of separation of powers as a bar to judicial
review of prosecutorial charging discretion, argues that this tradition is a
product of nineteenth century thinking about the limits of judicial power and
that it was established "before the successes of the modem system of limited
judicial review became fully recognized." 126 Again he uses comparative
criminal procedure to make his point, contending that "[t]he usual assumption
that the prosecuting power is inherently unsuitable for judicial review is
127
contradicted by the experience in West Germany."
This contention is a misuse of comparative criminal procedure that is quite
unfair to the American adversary tradition and that is superficial in its treatment
of the civil law tradition. Judicial review of prosecutorial power is workable in
the civil law tradition because the roles of the judge and the prosecutor are very
different in that tradition and because the nature of criminal trials are different
in that tradition. First of all, judicial review of a prosecutor's decision to
charge or not to charge faces no separation of powers principle in the civil law
tradition.128 The position of prosecutor was the result of splitting the
investigative function of the judiciary from its judicial function so that
prosecutors are actually considered to be to judicial figures in the civil law
tradition operating under the same professional obligations of balance and
fairness in carrying out their duties that apply to judges.1 29 In many civil law
systems the position of prosecutor remains formally a part of the judicial
system. 130 It is often the case that prosecutors and judges will have taken the
same exams, have the same system of hierarchical advancements, and even
receive the same pay whether they serve as prosecutor or judge.131 Moreover,
while both the positions of prosecutor and of judge are professional, civil
service positions, there is often considerable mobility between the two positions

Newman v. United States, 382 F.2d 479, 480-82 (D.C. Cir. 1967); see also Oyler v. Boles,

368 U.S.
448 (1962).
12 6

DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE, supra note 8, at 211.
Id. at 212.
128 InFrance, an investigating magistrate orjuge d'instrucionis formally in control of
the investigation. WEINREB, supra note 3, at 126; Weigend, supra note 8, at 389.
129 Herrmann, The Rule of Conpulsory Prosecution, supra note 8, at 469; .Weigend,
supranote 8, at 395.
130 MERRYMAN, supra note 4, at 129; Herrmann, The Rule of Compulsory
Prosecution,supra note 8, at 469.
131 In Italy and France, both judges and prosecutors are part of the magistrature, a
body of judicial officials that has no analog in the American legal system. See Frase, supra
note 3, at 561-65 (France); Pizzi & Marafoti, supra note 7, at 30 (Italy).
12 7
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and a judge or a prosecutor may apply for a judicial or prosecutorial vacancy
1 32
that comes open in the system and that seems attractive.
There is thus no separation of powers problem in putting a civil law judge
in the position of closely supervising the prosecutor and, given the civil law
judge's responsibility to develop the evidence at trial, it seems natural to give
the civil judge the power to control charging discretion. This power extends
133
even to reshaping the charges to more accurately fit the evidence at trial.
Because judges have the power to convict the defendant of any violation
established by the evidence at trial, the exact charges that a prosecutor chooses
to file are much less important in Germany because the judge can reshape them
134
to fit the evidence.
To ask that an American judge play a similarly aggressive role with respect
to charging decisions raises serious separation of powers problems and runs
contrary to the adversary tradition in which judges are assigned a neutral and
passive role with respect to charging decisions and the development of evidence
at trial. 135 If we wish to limit prosecutorial power and "reform" our
prosecutors to fit the civil law model, we would have to reform our concept of
judicial power to fit the civil law model as well.136 Without changing the entire
132 LANGBEIN, GERMANY, supra note 2, at 105; Pizzi & Marafloti, supra note 7, at

30.

133 LANGBEIN, GERMANY, supra note 2, at 66; Herrmann, The Rule of Conpulsory
Prosecution,supranote 8, at 495 n.150.
134 Weigend, supra note 8, at 399, 403 (describing the power of the judge to reshape
the charges to fit the evidence and noting that the decision what to charge or how many
counts to file is of no real consequence under German procedure).
135 On the distrust of strong judicial power, the Court made these comments in
Duncan v. Lou na:

IThe jury trial provisions in the Federal and State Constitutions reflect a
fundamental decision about the exercise of official power-a reluctance to entrust
plenary power over the life and liberty of the citizen to one judge or to a group of
judges. Fear of unchecked power, so typical of our State and Federal
Governments in other respects, found expression in the criminal law in this
insistence upon community participation in the determination of guilt or
innocence.
Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 156 (1968).
136 Professor Monroe Freedman has strongly criticized Judge John Sirica for the role
that Sirica played in uncovering the Watergate cover-up. See Monroe Freedman,
EvaluatingSirca'sWatergate Legacy, LEGAL TIMES, Sept. 7, 1992, at 7. Freedman asserts
that Sirica went beyond the impartial role assigned a judge in the adversary system and
assumed an inquisitorial role. Id.
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concept of what it means to be a judge in the American adversary tradition, it
seems inevitable that judicial review of prosecutorial discretion would be a
formality.
Besides the conceptual problems in terms of separation of powers that are
raised by the concept of judicial review of prosecutorial charging discretion,
judicial review under the civil law model raises practical difficulties under our
adversary system were a judge to play an active role in deciding whether or not
formal criminal charges should be preferred against a defendant. As an initial
matter, how would this review work? Would a judge go over the file with the
prosecutor? 137 If it is a discussion prior to charging, would the person, yet to
be accused, be represented at this hearing or would it be a discussion solely
between the prosecutor and the judge? And how would review work in
situations in which, for example, a judge realizes that the prosecutor has
reached a conclusion that unfairly favors the defendant? For example, what if a
judge realizes that the prosecutor who has decided not to file charges against
someone has failed to see the powerful evidentiary significance of a certain item
of evidence? Would the judge have the obligation to point it out to the
prosecutor? Or what if a judge reviewing a formal charging decision realizes
that conviction will be quite difficult under the theft theory as charged, but
would be straightforward under a theory of embezzlement? Should the judge
explain to the prosecutor the advantages of an embezzlement theory and order
the case to be refiled on that theory? Or what if the judge realizes in reviewing
the decision not to charge the accused with a serious crime (because the
evidence would not sustain a conviction) that the prosecution has failed to
consider an obvious investigative lead that could provide crucial evidence?
Should the judge order this lead pursued or keep quiet and evaluate the file as it
is?
Notice that in the civil law tradition these issues do not cause problems.
But in the American adversary tradition, for the judge to be advising a
prosecutor on investigative, evidentiary, or strategic matters puts the judge in
an awkward position between the judge's obligation to ensure that the results of
the process are accurate and fair and the judge's obligation to remain neutral
between the parties. It is an accepted consequence of the adversary system that

137 It is not clear whether American judges would have the background and expertise

that is necessary to supervise prosecutorial discretion on the civil law model. In civil law
systems, judges are career civil servants, as are states' attorneys, and there is often
considerable movement back and forth from judge to state attorney and vice versa. See
supra text at notes 130-32. But in the United States, judges may come to the bench with no
prosecutorial experience and with trial experience limited to civil matters.
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the skill of the advocates may affect the outcome of the trial. 13 8 But once the
system starts down the road of asking judges to intervene in the charging and
plea bargaining process in order to assure substantive fairness to defendants, to
victims, to the public, and so on, it becomes difficult to understand why judges
should not supervise and intervene at trial for exactly the same reasons.
This tension between a judge's obligation to remain neutral and a judge's
obligations to assure the substantive fairness of a prosecutor's actions will be
discussed more fully in the next Part which deals with judicial review of
prosecutorial discretion as it is manifested in plea bargaining decisions. That
Part will show why it is very difficult for judges to reject plea bargains in our
system and why it seems unlikely that judicial review of a prosecutor's
discretion in charging would be any more effective than it is in supervising
such discretion in plea bargaining.

V. THE LESSONS OF PLEA BARGAINING
Up to this point, this Article has discussed only a prosecutor's discretion in
deciding whether or not to charge someone with a crime and has avoided
discussing plea bargaining. It is difficult, however, to separate the two issues
because they are almost always merged in the thinking of prosecutors and
defense attorneys. Plea bargaining discussions will often begin before formal
charges are even filed, sometimes in an effort by the arrestee's lawyer to
convince the prosecutor that some alternative to criminal prosecution, such as
restitution, a diversion program, or a deferred prosecution, is preferable to
criminal prosecution under the circumstances of the particular case.
Not surprisingly, those who are critical of the broad discretion the system
has vested in prosecutors, are particularly concerned about plea bargaining
because it allows the prosecutor to guarantee a defendant a maximum sentence
with the result that the judge's hands in sentencing are tied by the terms of the

138 Commenting on the outcome of the second trial in the beating of Rodney King,
Professor Peter Arenella observed: "A trial is like a piece of theater. No two trials are the

same, and in an adversary system, the quality of justice depends on the quality of the
adversaries." Riley, supra note 100, at 4. Professor Lloyd Weinreb, who has proposed a
complete shift of our criminal justice system to a system that is modeled on the civil law
tradition, argues that we should not accept a system that permits the quality of advocates to
affect the outcome: "The very dependence of our criminal process on the individual
performances of the prosecutor and defense counsel that makes the appointment of counsel
so critical ensures that whether or not defendants stand equal before the law, they stand
unequally under its judgments." WEINRB, supra note 3, at 9-10.
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bargain. 139 Thus, a prosecutor who agrees to allow a defendant to plead guilty
to a burglary charge in return for a promise that any sentence imposed will not
exceed one year has, in effect, determined the sentence that the defendant will
receive. 40
But there is an important distinction between a prosecutor's exercise of
discretion in deciding whether to file criminal charges and a prosecutor's
discretion in plea bargaining: All plea bargains must be approved by a judge
who has the authority to reject a plea bargain that the judge believes does not
serve the public interest. 141 But while judges have the authority to reject plea
bargains, and do it on occasion, it is not a common occurrence. 142 Obviously,
139

Professor Vorenberg argues against the plea bargaining power of prosecutors as

follows:
Little in the background, training, self-selection, or general outlook of
prosecutors suggests that they are best equipped to make whatever diagnostic and
rehabilitative judgments may be involved in deciding, for example, which
potential defendants will benefit from participation in a diversion program. The
argument for vesting prosecutors with this function is plausible only if the judges
and probation and parole officials commonly thought to have such expertise do
not in fact have it. Even then, prosecutors retain their responsibility for getting
convictions, and it would require special agility of outlook for them to be able
simultaneously to decide what treatment will be best for particular offenders.
Vorenberg, supra note 15, at 1557-58; see also DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE, supranote

8, at 196-97.
140 Not all plea bargaining involves explicit "sentence bargaining." Some jurisdictions
permit only "charge bargaining," in which the prosecutor and defense attorney bargain over
the count or counts to which the defendant will plead guilty in exchange for dismissal of the
remaining charges, but the prosecutor is not permitted to bargain as to a specific sentence
limit within the sentencing range for the offense to which the defendant pled guilty. See,
e.g., Kuh, supra note 94, at 49-55. But there may not be much difference in practice as
charge bargains from higher offenses to lower category offenses can also significantly
restrict the sentencing discretion of the judge. See generally Albert W. Alschuler, The Trial
Judge'sRole in PleaBargaining,Part1,76 COLUM. L. REv. 1059, 1136-46 (1976).
An example of sentence bargaining will be discussed in this Part because such
bargaining is common and because it is the most controversial form of plea bargaining in
that it often explicitly limits the sentencing discretion that a judge would otherwise have
under the particular criminal statute.
141 2 LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 53, § 20.4, at 657.

142 Professor Albert Alschuler, who has studied plea bargaining for many years, cites
many authorities in support of the conclusion that "judges almost automatically ratify
prosecutorial charge reductions and sentence recommendations." See Alschuler, supra note
140, at 1065-66 (and authorities cited therein). Professor Alschuler states that on rare
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there are courts that are so overloaded with cases that plea bargaining is the
only way that judges can keep control of their dockets and hence they cannot
realistically reject plea bargains. 143 Even where case pressure is not intense,
however, conscientious and responsible judges are not well positioned in the
American adversary tradition to reject plea bargains and force the parties to
trial. The reason why it is awkward for judges to do so, can perhaps best be
explained through an example. Consider the following acquaintance-rape
hypothetical:
A female college student, who had gone dancing at a local bar with some
friends, met the defendant during the evening and enjoyed dancing with him a
couple of times during the evening. Around 11 p.m., the student decided to
leave and told her friends that she would walk the short distance back to her
apartment. The defendant overheard her and said that he would walk along
with her as he was ready to leave, too, and was heading in the same direction.
The victim claims that when she unlocked the door of her house and turned to
say goodbye to the defendant, he grabbed her, pushed her inside the door,
threw her to the floor, put his hands around her neck and threatened to choke
her unless she slid off her jeans and had intercourse with him. An hour later,
when her roommate returned and the victim told her what had happened, she
reported the rape to the police. The defendant admits the intercourse, but
claims that the victim instigated the sex and that it was entirely consensual. The
prosecutor and the defense counsel have proposed a plea bargaining agreement
in which the defendant will plead guilty to sexual assault and will receive a
sentence limited to probation. Assume further that the judge firmly believes
that a sentence of two years in prison would be appropriate if the defendant
were to be convicted of such a sexual assault at trial.

The decision whether or not to accept a plea bargain proposal, such as the
one in question, reveals a tension that exists in the role of the judge in the
American criminal justice system. On the one hand, a judge is assigned a
passive role with respect to the determination of guilt: the parties present the
evidence, the judge rules on procedural and evidentiary issues, and the decision
on guilt then goes to a jury of citizens. But judges, except in death penalty
occasions judges will reject the prosecutor's sentence recommendation and impose a harsher
sentence on the defendant in order to maintain "the theory that prosecutors lacked the
power to bind the court," but the reality is that plea bargaining yields judicial sentencing
authority to prosecutors in order to make plea bargaining work. Id. at 1066-67.
143 In 1983, it was reported that in New York Criminal Court, which handles minor
crimes, judges have a caseload of 100 cases a day and only I % of their 200,000 cases can
be tried. See Cattle CarJustice, N.Y. TIMEs, July 2, 1983, at 20. See generally William T.
Pizzi, Batson v. Kentucky: Curing the Disease but Killing the Patient, 1987 Sup. CT. REv.
97, 139.
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cases, have always had the duty of imposing sentence on those convicted and
the sentencing process has decidedly inquisitorial overtones. 144 Instead of
relying on an adversary presentation to develop background information about
the defendant and about the particular crime, the court investigates these issues
itself through the probation department, which is an arm of the court. The
probation department will conduct an investigation and then file with the court
a presentence report, containing its conclusions and recommendations. The
evidentiary rules that tightly restrict the form and substance of evidence
admitted at trial drop away at the sentencing phase, allowing a judge to
consider a much wider range of evidence than could ever be presented at trial.
A plea bargain that guarantees a defendant a certain sentence can impinge
on the judge's sentencing authority by committing the judge to imposing a
sentence that is substantially less than the judge would impose if the defendant
were convicted at trial. Because such plea bargains put the judge in the position
of having to ratify the prosecutor's decision as to the appropriate sentence for
the case, such plea bargains shift sentencing authority from the judge to the
prosecutor. Thus, in the above hypothetical, the judge is being asked to ratify a
sentence of probation that the judge believes to be substantially less than the
sentence the crime and the defendant merit.
Yet it would be highly unlikely that a judge would reject the proposed plea
bargain. In the first place, the judge is not in a good position to understand the
strengths and weaknesses of the case-the judge will not have the full
investigative file in front of her and it is often the case that the judge will not
have heard testimony from any of the main prosecution witnesses. The judge is
thus not well-positioned to assess the constitutional, evidentiary, or strategic
issues that may be lurking in the case. In the plea bargaining hypothetical, in
which the judge believes that the proposed sentence is substantially less than
the crime deserves, a judge might try to learn more about the reasons that have
convinced the prosecutor that this plea bargain is in the public interest. But it is
very difficult for a judge to have a candid and open discussion about the
strengths and weaknesses of the case in our adversary tradition. It would be
unethical for a judge to meet with the prosecutor "ex parte" to discuss in detail
weaknesses in the case. 145 And to ask the prosecutor proposing the plea
bargain to explain in open court the specific reasons that have led the
prosecutor to believe that the proposed plea bargain is in the public interest can
be awkward. If the prosecutor were pressed to explain the motivation for
144 William T. Pizzi, Some Worries About Sentencing Guidelines, 64 U. CoLO. L.

REV. 14707,709
(1993).
5

See AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, Canon

3B(7) (1990); AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, MODEL RULES OF PROFESSiONAL CONDUCr,
Rule 3.5(b) (1983).
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accepting the proposed bargain, it could put the prosecutor in the position of
pointing out to the defense strategic weaknesses in the prosecution's case that
146
may not have been seen or fully appreciated by the defense.
Another reason why judges in the American adversary tradition are not
well-positioned to reject plea bargains based on their own independent
assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of the case stems from the fact that
the nature of trials in the American adversary tradition differs so fundamentally
from those in the civil law tradition. A civil law judge has a much easier task
assessing the evidence and predicting the likely course the case will take at
trial. In the first place, all relevant evidence is admissible evidence at a civil
law trial. 147 While it is not strictly accurate to say that there are no rules of
evidence that apply in civil law trials, 148 as a practical matter that is the
case. 149 Because the system does not use exclusively lay juries and because the
civil law system is ideologically committed to the principle that all relevant
evidence should be considered in an effort to determine the truth, 150 the
balancing of the probative value of a piece of evidence against its prejudicial
value that is a standard feature of American trials simply does not occur in civil
law trials. 151 In the civil law tradition, many pieces of evidence that would
provoke serious evidentiary battles between the prosecutor and the defense
attorney at an American trial will be brought out by a civil law judge at trial
without even the mildest objection. 152 Witnesses are permitted considerable
latitude in their responses and there is an air of informality to the proceedings,
especially when compared to American trials. 153
146 Robert Heilbroner talks about the awkward situation in which he was placed,
when, as an Assistant District Attorney (ADA) in Manhattan, a judge, outside of the hearing
of the defense attorney during a pause in plea negotiations in a serious case, turned to him
and asked him, "Mr. DA, you've got a conviction there. I hope he turns down the offer and
gets what he deserves. Really, why did the ADA recommend nine to eighteen?"
HI-IMRONER, supra note 93, at 238.
147 LANGBEiN, GmEMANY, supra note 2, at 68-69; Langbein, ControllingProsecutorial

Discretion, supranote 5, at 447.
148 See generally LANGBEIN, GERMANY, supra note 2, at 67-69; Miijan Dama~ka,
Evidentialy Bariersto Conviction and Two Models of Criminal Procedure,121 U. PA. L.
REV. 506 (1973).
149 Damalka, supra note 11, at 130; Langbein, Land Without Plea Bargaining,supra

note 2,
at 207; Weigend, supra note 8, at 385.
15 0
LANGBFIN, GERMANY, supranote 2, at 69-70; Weigend, supra note 8, at 385.
151 LANGBEIN, GERMANY, supra note 2, at 68-69. Civil law countries believe that the
professional judges can protect against misuse of evidence by lay judges and, to that end,
only the professional judges are permitted to read the dossier. Id. at 67.
152

Langbein, Land Without PleaBargaining,supra note 2, at 207.
153 LANGBEIN, GERMANY, supra note 2, at 65, 74-75.
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In addition to a general skepticism about the wisdom of erecting the sort of
tight evidentiary screen that is one of the hallmarks of the American trial
system, criminal trials in civil law systems also have a broader scope of inquiry
so that much more evidence is directly relevant to the issues being tried. A civil
law trial is concerned both with guilt and a possible sentence. This means that a
defendant's background will always be explored at trial, usually by the judge
talking directly to the defendant at the start of trial about the defendant's
background. 154 Thus, the thorny issues that frequently arise in the American
system, involving the admissibility of prior convictions or other acts of
misconduct for substantive purposes, 155 do not pose a problem at civil law
trials-who the-defendant is and what he has done in the past is always relevant
and admissible. 156 Because a civil law trial does not separate the issue of guilt
from the issue of sentencing, the trial is the only time that a defendant can raise
mitigating factors. 157 For this reason, as well as cultural reasons, defendants in
civil law systems tend not to remain silent either during investigation or at trial,
but usually cooperate with the system to the extent of freely answering
questions about themselves or the crime. 158 Thus, surprise is not the weapon in
159
the civil law system that it can be at an American trial.
Finally, if something does happen at a civil law trial that affects the
verdict, it can usually be appealed to a higher court by the prosecutor or the
defense attorney and there is broad appellate review of the decision of the trial
court. 160 In European systems, a trial is an important step in the procedure
designed to determine whether the defendant is guilty or not, but it is only a
step. By contrast, a trial in the American legal system is of dominant
importance because appellate review of the verdict itself is not permitted. If a
judge makes an erroneous evidentiary ruling that cripples the prosecution's case
or if a judge gives an erroneous jury instruction that favors the defendant, there
154

Id.at 71.
155 So sophisticated is the issue of uncharged misconduct evidence in the United States
that there is now a book, with regular supplements, devoted exclusively to the issues
surrounding the admissibility of such evidence. See EDWARD J. IMvINKELRaID,
UNCHARGED MISCONDUCr EviDENcE (1984).
156 LANGBEIN, GERMANY, supra note 2, at 76-77.
157 Pizzi & Marafioti, supranote 7, at 8.
15

8 Damahka, supra note 148, at 527; Langbein, Land Without Plea Bargaining, supra

note 5, at 208-09, 218-19; Weigend, supranote 8, at 396.
159

Because the dossier must contain all the incriminating and exculpating evidence
gathered during the pretrial investigation, unpleasant surprises for the defense are also
extremely unlikely at a civil law trial. GERHARD O.W. MUELLER & FRP_ LE POOLE-

GRIFFrrus, CoMARATIVE C1UavNAL PRocEDuRE 25 (1969).
160
See supranote 38 and accompanying text.
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is no appeal from an acquittal no matter how erroneous. 161 A similar
presumption of finality attaches to guilty verdicts; while defendants may appeal
adverse rulings during the pretrial and trial process that may have affected the
verdict, the verdict itself is not subject to direct review and scrutiny. 162
In the plea bargaining process, the many issues that may affect guilt and
sentencing, including constitutional issues, evidentiary issues, problems of
proof, and the background and culpability of the defendant, are compromised
in a particular bargain. Whether a legal system should permit these important
issues to be compromised through plea bargaining is an important question. But
both the Court 163 and the American Bar Association Standards On Criminal
Justice164 accept plea bargaining as an important feature of our criminal justice
system. Civil law systems are ideologically opposed to plea bargaining 165
because it is seen as inconsistent with a judge's duty to determine guilt and to
apply the law uniformly to all offenders. But the adversary tradition, in which
the parties control the presentation of evidence, uniformity is emphasized less,
and the judge does not have an inquisitorial function with respect to the
determination of guilt, is a more fertile environment for plea bargaining. If the
opposing parties have reached a compromise that they believe is appropriate for
the resolution of the case in question, it is very difficult for a judge to reject the
plea bargain and put herself in the position of second-guessing the prosecutor's
assessment of the public interest or the defense's decision that the plea furthers
its interest.
This is not to say that plea bargaining in the American adversary tradition
is desirable 166 or inevitable. 167 But once a system approves the sorts of
161 See supra note 98.

162 Even when there were post-verdict allegations from one of the jurors that certain
jury members drank to excess at lunch during the trial and even ingested illegal drugs in the

jury room itself during the trial, the Supreme Court in Tanner v.United States, ruled that
such impeachment of the verdict by a juror after the fact would "disrupt the finality of the
process" and was properly barred by Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b). Tanner v. United
States, 483 U.S. 107 (1987).
163 The constitutionality of plea bargaining has been upheld many times even in rather
shocking fact situations. See, e.g., Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357 (1978); Brady v.
United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970); North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970).
164 See AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, STANDARDS RELATING TO THE ADMINISTRATION

OFCRIMINAL JusTIcE, The Prosecution Function, Standard 3-4.1 (3d ed. 1992).
165

Weigend, supra note 8, at 386. But despite the ideological opposition to plea

bargaining, forms of plea bargaining are beginning to emerge on the continent. See supra

notes 41-46 and accompanying text. For a discussion of other forms of plea bargaining on
the continent, see Pizzi & Marafioti, supranote 7, at 35-37.
166 Professor Alschuler has argued that defendants lose respect for judges and the
entire system when they end up serving time as the result of a deal worked out between the
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sentence bargains of which the acquaintance-rape hypothetical is an example, it
becomes difficult conceptually and practically for a judge to reject the proffered
bargain, even when the bargain impinges significantly on the judge's
sentencing authority.' 68
Our experience with judicial supervision over plea bargaining strongly
suggests that adding to our system new pretrial procedures designed to place
prosecutorial charging decisions under judicial supervision is unlikely to be
very effective. 169 And in a system that is already heavily encumbered with

pretrial procedures that have no analogs in civil law systems, (including
discovery motions, suppression motions, and motions in limine) adding another
level of pretrial hearings might turn out to be a step in the wrong direction
absent powerful evidence both that abuse of prosecutorial discretion in charging
is a serious problem and that such hearings will be effective in remedying the
problem.170
prosecutor and defense attorney. Alsehuler, supranote 140, at 1066. There seems no doubt
that the cathartic effect that a trial can have for the victim, the defendant, and the public is
lost when a case is resolved in a plea bargain, even if the sentence received is the same the
defendant would have received if convicted at trial.
167 Some critics of plea bargaining have suggested that our legal system might be
better off giving defendants a sentencing discount to encourage the waiver of the right to a
jury trial instead of permitting the state to encourage defendants to waive the right to trial
altogether. Albert W. Alschuler, Implementing the Defendant's Right to Trial: Alternatives
to the Plea Bargaining System, 50 U. CHI. L. REv. 931, 1024-43 (1983); Stephen J.
Schulhofer, Is PleaBargainingInevitable?, 97 HARV. L. Rnv. 1037 (1984).

168 In United States v. Ammidown, the trial judge rejected a plea bargain that would
have permitted a defendant charged with first degree murder to plead guilty to second
degree murder. Subsequently, the defendant was convicted of first degree murder. United
States v. Ammidown, 497 F.2d 615, 618 (D.C. Cir. 1973). The court of appeals reversed
the conviction and ordered the trial judge to accept a plea to second degree murder,
concluding that while the judge should not be a rubber stamp for the prosecutor's decision,
there was no undue interference with the sentencing domain of the judge in this case. Id. at
624. Not surprisingly, Ammidown has been severely criticized for effectively ratifying the
shift of judicial sentencing authority from the judge to the prosecutor. See Alschuler, supra
note 140, at 1075-76.
169 For a discussion critical of the view that prosecutorial guidelines would permit
effective judicial supervision of prosecutorial discretion, see infra notes 181-88 and
accompanying text.
170 Professor Norman Abrams has argued in favor of prosecutorial guidelines, but he
argues that defendants charged with a crime should not be able to seek judicial review under
such guidelines. He concludes that the cost to the system would be too great in return for
the comparatively few defendants who would be successful in such a challenge. Norman
Abrams, Internal Policy: Guiding the Exercise of ProsecutorialDiscretion, 19 UCLA L.
REv. 1, 51-52 (1971); see discussion infra notes 189-92 and accompanying text.

1993]

PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION

1363

VI. CAPTURING PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION IN OFFICIAL GUIDELINES
Critics of broad American prosecutorial discretion, such as Professors
Davis 171 and Vorenberg,17 2 rely heavily on guidelines as the key for reforming
prosecutorial discretion and for placing that discretion under closer judicial
control. Professor Vorenberg argues that prosecutors should be forced to
promulgate official guidelines because he thinks they will not do so unless
forced to do so.' 73 These published guidelines could then serve as the basis of
charge or plea negotiations in an individual case. 174 Once such guidelines were
put in place, Professor Vorenberg contemplates that defendants would be able
to use the guidelines to challenge a prosecutor's charging decision in court and
obtain judicial review of the prosecutor's actions if the defendant believes his
or her case was not handled in conformity with the guidelines. 175 Vorenberg
believes that this screening by judges of the charges levied at the defendant
should logically be part of the preliminary hearing:
There are obvious advantages to having such review before trial, and logically

it should be part of the preliminary heating. This would require a major change
in jurisdictions where the preliminary hearing's screening function is a dead
letter, for the prosecution would have to offer enough evidence to show that
the charge was consistent with its stated policies. In some cases the evidence

would be no more than that shown to establish probable cause. In others it
might be necessary to show more: for example, why an offense was treated as
aggravated,
176 so that the defendant was disqualified from a diversion

program.

Such judicial review, brought only by those charged with a crime, is very
different from the sort of balanced review that occurs in civil law countries 177
in which decisions not to prosecute are also subject to review. 178 But, except
for the fact that the review proposed is unbalanced-allowing defendants, but
171 DAVIS, DISCRETIONARYJUSTICE, supra note 8, at 189-90.
172
Vorenberg, supra note 15, at 1562-65.
173 Id. at 1562, 1565.
174

Id. at 1565.

175 Id. at 1570.

176 Id. at 1570-71.
177 See supra notes 22-31 and accompanying text.
178 It has been claimed by Professor Davis that the vast majority of the abuses of
prosecutorial discretion-"nine-tenths" is the figure he gives--occur in decisions not to
prosecute. DAVIS, DIsCRETIONARY JuSTICE, supra note 8, at 192 n.2; see also Abrams,

supranote 170, at 47.
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not victims, to challenge prosecutorial discretion-it seems that there can be no
strong objection to this proposal. The prosecutor's office still retains
tremendous discretion in setting law enforcement priorities for that office, but
must now do so through specific guidelines rather than ad hoc decisions in each
case. On the other hand, the guidelines provide standards-in a sense the
prosecutor's own standards-against which the handling of a specific case can
be reviewed and measured. Thus, judicial review is meaningful but limited.
Finally, this review ensures that similar cases will be handled similarly by that
office and thus protects defendants from arbitrary or discriminatory treatment.
But the issue of guidelines is a complicated one. As was suggested earlier
in this Article, 179 there are sound reasons, both in terms of office
professionalism and office efficiency, that push in favor of internal office
guidelines or alternative internal office procedures that help ensure the
consistent handling of high-volume, criminal cases.' 8 0 Judges like to see
similar types of cases handled similarly; so do defense lawyers, and so do
prosecutors.
Thus, there will often exist internal policies that might resemble the
following two examples:
Policy One

It is the general policy of this office that all first-time drug
offenders arrested in possession of a small amount of
cocaine shall be offered a deferred prosecution if they agree
to complete a treatment program.

Policy Two It shall be the general policy of this office that all persons
arrested carrying a concealed weapon shall be prosecuted to
the extent that no plea bargain shall be offered or accepted
that does not include at least thirty days in jail.
When prosecutors' offices are likely to part company with the call for
guidelines from a critic such as Professor Vorenberg is not over the desirability
of guidelines or policies, but whether those sorts of policies must be officially
promulgated and made available to the general public. Most prosecutors'
offices prefer to keep such policies informal and "unofficial" for a number of
reasons. First, if the policy or guideline is one that offers some leniency to
offenders, especially felony offenders, the office will not wish to undercut the
deterrent value of the penal law by announcing policies that assure offenders
179

See supra Part lI.C.
180 Professor Vorenberg fails to see that consistency has clear benefits to prosecutors.
Vorenberg, supra note 15, at 1564-65.

19931

PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION

1365

lenient treatment. 18 ' Thus, even if an office is willing to adopt a policy such as
Policy One above that permits treatment to substitute for prosecution for first
time cocaine offenders, the office might be very reluctant to publicize that
policy. It might have the reverse effect of encouraging young people to
82
experiment with cocaine knowing that the first offense will be "forgiven."
A second reason why a prosecutors office might be reluctant to adopt such
a policy is the fact that prosecutors have to run for reelection 8 3 and any policy
that might be seen as "soft" on crime can raise a political issue that might put
the prosecutor on the defensive. Hence, the office might be more comfortable
with an informal policy that is well-known to those in the system-such as the
defense attorneys, judges, probation officers, and police officers-but is not
formally adopted, or even written. In an era in which citizens are angry at the
criminal justice system and concerned about crime,' 84 formally adopted
guidelines may result in guidelines that are considerably harsher than those
policies that an office would be willing to live with on an informal basis. 18 5
A third reason why prosecutors' offices are normally reluctant to adopt
formal published guidelines is that prosecutors' offices prefer that policies are
informal so that they retain flexibility for unusual cases. Thus, to use the drug
policy announced in Policy One as an example, consider a person arrested in
possession of a small amount of cocaine, who was previously arrested three
months earlier in possession of a large amount of cocaine, but the cocaine was
suppressed prior to trial. A prosecutor might be reluctant to extend a policy of
leniency for "first time" offenders to a person who is in the system for a
second time in such a short period of time. Or consider Policy Two above.
Despite the office's tough gun policy, there may well occur situations in which
a prosecutor wishes to deviate from that policy in an unusual situation where
the equities strongly favor such a result. For example, imagine an inner city
resident who must return from her job late at night and who has been robbed
181 Abrams, spra note 170, at 29-30.
182 The United States Attorney's Office in Miami refuses to divulge the kilogram level
at which that office declines to prosecute drug cases because it fears that drug dealers would
exploit this limit by packaging drugs so as to avoid federal prosecution. See supranote 88.
183 See supranote 63 and accompanying text.
184 For a discussion of the politicalization of criminal justice issues in the United
States, see supraPart M.A.
185 In State v. Pet'tt,the prosecutor's office adopted a policy mandating the filing of
habitual criminal complaints against any defendant who had three or more prior felonies.
State v. Pettitt, 609 P.2d 1364 (Wash. 1980). In the case of Pettitt, this policy meant a
mandatory life sentence for a defendant with three non-violent property crimes. The
Washington Supreme Court had to struggle to reverse the conviction, reasoning that the
mandatory policy constituted an abuse of discretion. Id. at 1368.
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previously with the result that she feels it necessary to carry a gun. If such a
person happens to be arrested in possession of a gun, a prosecutor might wish
to make an exception to the requirement of jail time for any concealed weapon
and allow a plea bargain that would avoid jail time. Whatever policy an office
adopts, one can rest assured that special cases will always occur that were not
contemplated when the policy was put into effect and that argue for an
exception. 186 Presumably, under the Vorenberg proposal the decision to
contravene the office policy on concealed weapons would not be reviewed
because the defendant would not want such review and only defendants can
seek review under his scheme. But, obviously, later defendants charged with
possession of a concealed weapon will argue that their cases deserve
dispensation from the office policy requiring jail time for carrying a concealed
weapon.
This raises a fourth reason, and probably the major reason, why
prosecutors' offices prefer to keep charging and plea bargaining policies
informal (which may mean that they are unwritten). Prosecutors would resist
strongly the idea that these policies should be turned into litigation weapons
with which to attack prosecutorial decisions in individual cases. The idea that
the cocaine offender mentioned in the previous paragraph who was arrested
three months earlier for possession of a sizable quantity of cocaine, but had it
suppressed, should be able to challenge in court the refusal of the prosecutor's
office to treat him leniently under Policy One would deeply disturb a
prosecutor's office. In the first place, the separation of powers problem18 7 is
not solved by guidelines, it is only papered over. To have a court interpreting
the office's own policy on cocaine so as to clarify for that office who qualifies
as a "first-time offender" or what qualifies as a "small amount of cocaine"
would be viewed as interference with the power of the executive branch. But
more important is the fact that such review would be adding a whole new layer
of pretrial review that dwarfs any of the efficiencies that guidelines can achieve.
Anyone who has seen what has happened with federal sentencing guidelines,
and the burgeoning of case law as a result, 188 has to worry about the

186 David Heilbroner in his account of the time he spent in the Manhattan District
Attorney's Office describes two instances in which office policies clashed with the equities
of the situation, in one case ending with the suicide of the defendant. HELRONER, supra
note 93, at 245-51, 273-79.
187
See supraPart IV.
188
Although intended to bring predictability and simplicity to sentencing, the
guidelines seem to have backfired. It has been reported that between 1988 and 1992, there
have been docketed 23,000 appeals in the federal circuit courts involving the guidelines. See

Cris Carmody, Sentencing OverloadHits the Circuits, NAT'L LJ., Apr. 5, 1993, at 1. This
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tremendous potential that prosecutorial guidelines have to become tactical
weapons for the defense. Permitting judicial review of prosecutorial guidelines
is likely to result in guidelines that have none of the simplicity of Policies One
and Two, but are instead hedged with general exceptions so as to ensure
maximum flexibility for departures from the policy when good cause arises.
Professor Norman Abrams is an advocate of prosecutorial guidelines, but
he concludes that permitting defendants to challenge the decision to prosecute
them (as advocated by Professor Vorenberg) should not be permitted. 18 9 He
concludes that "the clogging of the system which would result far outweighs
the possible benefits." 190 As for the argument that such review will be easy for
courts to handle because such review is only "limited" judicial review, 19 1 he
responds that such an argument "misapprehends the ingenuity of defense
192
counsel."
But whether specific, publicly-announced guidelines, such as Policies One
and Two above, could be kept from being turned into litigation weapons is a
19 3
matter on which this author has some doubt.

A. The Limits of Guidelines
One might argue that policies such as the two examples given in the
previous subpart are not good policies, because better drafting would have
resulted in a drug policy or a concealed weapon policy that indicated the
exceptions that would be made to the particular policy and would have defined
the terms in the policy more completely so as to give better and more complete
guidance for future cases. But can one really expect that detailed guidelines
despite the fact that the departure rate from the guidelines is very small. Schulhofer, supra

note 75, at 851.
189 See Abrams, supranote 170, at 52.
190 Id.

191 "Limited judicial review" is the way Professor Davis describes the review of
prosecutorial discretion he has in mind. DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JusTICE, supra note 8, at

211; see
supra notes 126-27 and accompanying text.
192
See Abrams, supra note 170, at 52 n.176.
193 Because of fear that their office policies might be turned into litigation weapons,
the Denver District Attorney's office refuses to put its charging policies in writing.

Telephone Interview with Nathan Coats, Chief Deputy District Attorney (Sept. 21, 1993).
The Boulder County District Attorney's office takes a somewhat different tack, but
with the same objective of avoiding litigation based on its charging guidelines. There is a
written set of charging and plea bargaining guidelines and anyone can come to the office of
the Chief Trial Deputy and read the policies. Telephone Interview with Peter Hofstrom,
Chief Trial Deputy, Boulder County District Attorney's Office (Apr. 2, 1993). But the
Chief Trial Deputy will not permit the policies to be copied or taken from his office. Id.
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could ever be drafted that would anticipate every situation that might occur?
There are strong reasons for believing that general statements of policy that are
intended to cover the usual case, but not the unusual case, are about as much as
we can do with guidelines for prosecutorial discretion. Guidelines should be a
starting point for the exercise of prosecutorial discretion, but they cannot and
should not eliminate prosecutorial discretion completely.
To some extent, the bloom may be off the rose with respect to guidelines
in the wake of our experience with the attempt to capture federal sentencing
discretion in a set of detailed guidelines. While it sounds nice in theory to say
that sentencing discretion-and the abuse of sentencing discretion-can be
restricted or even eliminated through carefully drafted guidelines, it turns out to
be much harder to draft specific guidelines for sentencing than we might have
thought. 194 The overwhelming hostility to the federal sentencing guidelines 195
and the brutal unfairnesses 19 6 that can result strongly suggest that the dream of

narrow prosecutorial guidelines that would permit judicial review of
prosecutorial discretion is naive in the extreme. Prosecutorial discretion is a
much more complicated subject than is judicial sentencing discretion. The
federal sentencing guidelines do not account for many factors that have
traditionally been taken into account by prosecutors in deciding whether or not
to charge someone with a crime (because they sometimes bear on the
194

One commentator, who specializes in criminal appeals, has observed that the effect

of the federal sentencing guidelines has been complexity, not simplicity:

In the world of criminal litigation, sentencing law has become a major
growth industry. Although the federal sentencing guidelines were intended to
simplify the sentencing process and make punishment more uniform, they actually
have made the process more complex. Even the most ordinary cases now involve
heated battles over the proper application of the guidelines. In several circuits,
sentencing issues make up half the criminal appeals docket.
Ira Mickenberg, Crime Docket Was Quiet, NAT'L L.J, Aug. 23, 1993, at S6.
195 A survey of federal judges has revealed broad dissatisfaction with the guidelines
and it has been reported that at least one federal judge has resigned as a result of the
guidelines. Heaney, supra note 75, at 786; see also Hon. Joseph F. Weis, Jr., The Federal

Sentencing Guidelines - It's ime for a Reappraisal,29 AM. CRiM. L. REv. 823, 823-25
(1992) (reporting on a survey of district court judges undertaken by the Federal Courts
Study Committee that revealed strong dissatisfaction with the guidelines).
196 Many of the most serious problems stem from drug cases in which, for example,
the amount of drugs is a very poor barometer of culpability. See Schulhofer, supra note 75,
at 852-57. But other aspects of the guidelines are also troubling-prior criminal records
may also be a very poor indicator of culpability or of poor rehabilitative potential. See
Heaney, supra note 75, at 791-92.

19931

PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION

1369

rehabilitative potential of the individual), such as, the citizen's education,
vocational skills, employment record, family ties and responsibilities,
community ties, and the socioeconomic status of the offender. 197 If there is a
lesson in the sentencing guidelines it is that it is easy to agree that similar
offenders should be treated similarly, but deciding which offenders are
"similar" turns out to be much harder than we thought it would be. 198
But even if the federal sentencing guidelines can be turned into a success,
very little can be said about the likely success of similarly detailed prosecutorial
guidelines because prosecutorial discretion is much more complicated than
judicial sentencing discretion. In addition to taking into account the seriousness
of the offense and the background of the offender, a plea bargaining decision
has to include such other matters as the strength of the case, the willingness of
the victim to testify, the attractiveness of the case to the jury, the dangerousness
of the offender, and the value of information the defendant might provide in
future cases. It seems doubtful that any grid could hope to yield easy answers
to the sorts of difficult decisions that prosecutors have to make when the case at
hand is a serious one.
The difficulty of controlling prosecutorial discretion through specific
standards or guidelines is nicely illustrated by the chapter on the Prosecution
Function in the ABA Standards Relating to the Administration of Criminal
Justice. Standard 3-3.9(b) states that a prosecutor "may in some circumstances
and for good cause consistent with the public interest decline to prosecute,
notwithstanding that sufficient evidence may exist which would support a
conviction." 199 To help explain the sorts of items that a prosecutor may
consider in determining the public interest, Standard 3-3.9(b) lists seven factors
that are "illustrative" of the sorts of considerations that a prosecutor may take
into account in exercising discretion: the prosecutor's reasonable doubt that the
accused is in fact guilty, the extent of harm caused by the offense, the
disproportion of the authorized punishment in relation to the particular offense
or offender, possible improper motives of a complainant, the reluctance of the
victim to testify, the cooperation of the accused in the apprehension or
conviction of others, and the availability and likelihood of prosecution by
another jurisdiction.2°° The result is a rule that provides general guidance for
See Title I of the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98473, 98 Stat. 1987 (1984) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 994(d), (e), (k) (1988)); see also Barbara
S. Meierhoefer, Individualizedand Systemic Justice in the Federal Sentencing Process, 29
AM. CriM. L. REV. 889, 891 (1992).
198 See Meierhoefer, supra note 197, at 891.
199 AMECAN BAR ASSOCIATION, STANDARDS RELATING TO THE ADMINISTRATION OF
CRMIINALIUSTICE, The ProsecuionFunction, Standard 3-3.9 (3rd ed. 1992).
2
00 Id.
197
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how a prosecutor should go about exercising discretion, but basically reaffirms
the fact that prosecutors have broad discretion. Not only does the rule not
attempt to exhaust the factors that a prosecutor might consider in deciding how
to exercise discretion, but it does not indicate how the seven factors that are
listed should be balanced against each other when they push in different
directions.
Professor Vorenberg criticizes the ABA Standards because he thinks they
are "toothless" and that they do not limit discretion or provide specific
guidance. 201 Itis difficult to imagine guidelines, however, that would tell a
prosecutor in the acquaintance-rape hypothetical discussed in Part IV whether
or not she should accept the bargain in that case. Different prosecutors (and
different defense attorneys) may very well weigh the factors differently in that
case, when the punishment seems inadequate but there are a number of
obstacles to conviction. Ultimately, we have to recognize that the American
criminal justice system has moved from a system that relies heavily on
adjudication for the resolution of criminal cases to a system that emphasizes
negotiation and compromise. In such a system, there is no formula that will
yield easy answers to difficult cases.
B. An Euample of a Set of Guidelines
Professor Vorenberg, in his criticism of prosecutorial discretion, cannot
understand why so few jurisdictions have not followed the advice set out in the
ABA Standards urging each prosecutor's office to develop a statement of
"general policies to guide the exercise of prosecutorial discretion," which
should be maintained in an office handbook made available to the public. 202
This Article has tried to explain why prosecutors would be very reluctant to
formalize internal office policies and guidelines. One of the few prosecutors'
offices to adopt and publicize its internal office guidelines for charging and plea
bargaining was the Manhattan District Attorney's Office under the reign of
Richard Kuh. 203 Professor Vorenberg points to Mr. Kuh's statement of
charging and plea bargaining as an example of the sort of guidelines that he has
in mind *204
These guidelines set out the office expectations for the handling of criminal
cases which indicate the way most cases should be handled, but, at the same
201

Vorenberg, supra note 15, at 1563.

202

AMERcAN BAR ASSOCIATION, STANDARDS RELATING TO THE ADMINISTRATION OF

The ProsecutionFunction,Standard 3-2.5 (3rd ed. 1992).
203 Kuh, supra note 94, at 48 (reproducing an internal office memorandum on plea

CRmIAL JUSTICE,
bargaining).
2 04

Vorenberg, supra note 15, at 1562-63 n.136.
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time, leave prosecutors considerable discretion to depart from the general
expectations when the prosecutor believes that the facts of a particular case
justify such a departure. Thus, for example, the guidelines indicate that the
normal expectation for a felony case is that once a criminal case is charged (the
guidelines state that charges are not to be "puffed" 20 5), a prosecutor may
accept a plea to a lesser charge if it will drop the charge down one class of
felonies (or to a misdemeanor if the felony is already in the lowest class). 20 6 A
prosecutor may also accept a plea that would reduce the felony more than one
class, but may not do so unless there is a prepleading investigation (which is
functionally the same as a presentence report) into the background of the
20 7 If such
defendant and the defense consents to such an investigation.
prepleading report indicates to the assistant that "justice will be fully served
and the community fully protected" by permitting a plea reduction of more than
one class, the assistant has the authority to agree to a reduction of two classes
of felonies. 20 8 The guidelines state that such a reduction of two classes "is not
to be routinely granted" 2 9 and the guidelines go on to list eight aggravating
and seven mitigating factors, which are among the factors that an assistant
district attorney may wish to consider in deciding whether to reduce the charge
two classes. 2 10 The guidelines state that this list of aggravating and mitigating
factors "is not exhaustive, and cannot be." 21 The guidelines go on to state that
the "[a]ssistant district attorney who has examined the pre-pleading
investigation should consider family status, employment record, psychiatric
history, if any, and other factors revealed in that report," before deciding
whether to consent to a plea bargain that lowers the crime two classes. 2 12 The
guidelines also hold out the possibility of plea bargains in exceptional cases that
go beyond the two-classes limit, although any such bargains must first have the
2 13
approval of the bureau chief.
The result is a set of guidelines that help assistant district attorneys
understand the general office expectations, but leave individual assistant district
attorneys considerable discretion. Assistant district attorneys may offer
defendants a discount to the next lowest class of felonies in exchange for a plea,
but that is certainly not mandated and defendants have no right to such a
205 Kuh, supra note 94, at 50.
206 Id. at 55.
207 Id.
208 Id. at 57.
209 Id.
21

0 Id. at 58-59.
211 Id. at 59.
2 12

Id.

213 Id. at 58-59.
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bargain. Prosecutors may seek to give defendants a plea offer lowering the
crime by two classes of felonies, but, again, they do not have to entertain such
a possibility in a particular case. And even when there is a prepleading
investigation to decide whether a reduction of more than one class is
appropriate, it is possible that prosecutors will evaluate such prepleading
reports differently because there are so many aggravating and mitigating factors
and prosecutors may weigh them differently in trying to decide if "justice will
2 14
be fully served and the community fully protected" by the plea.
That considerable discretion remains in the hands of individual assistant
district attorneys even under these guidelines may suggest that these guidelines
are deficient or incomplete. But as these guidelines warn in the introduction,
discretion is needed in individual cases because "criminal cases involve people
and their actions, not fungible mechanical parts." 2 15 These guidelines are
excellent because they are completely realistic in understanding what guidelines
can and cannot achieve. 2 16 While guidelines, such as these, are helpful to
everyone in the system, they do not eliminate prosecutorial discretion nor
would they serve as a vehicle for meaningful judicial review of prosecutorial
discretion.
VII. CONCLUSION
This Article has tried to explain why broad prosecutorial discretion has
come to define the role of prosecutors in the American criminal justice system
and has also tried to show why attempts to limit prosecutorial discretion on the
European model are unlikely to work in this country.

214 Id.at 57.
2 15
Id.at 49.
216 The introduction states that the guidelines "will assure a considerable degree of
consistency," but goes on to state:

It is recognized, of course, that criminal cases involve people and their
actions, not fungible mechanical parts. Because conduct, particularly purported
criminal conduct (which by definition is conduct that departs from society's
norms), as well as the backgrounds of defendant can vary in ten thousand different
ways, some flexibility remains. There can be no exact "calculus," definable in
advance, to plea bargaining. Some discretion must remain to differentiate people
and cases, even though the same crime may be charged, and the defendants
superficially may seem similar.
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To some extent this Article has been a defense of the broad prosecutorial
discretion against those many critics who tend to see such discretion as an
accidental characteristic of the American system, or the result of a defect of
will or a usurpation of power. This Article has tried to show that broad
American prosecutorial discretion stems from a convergence of many forces
including (1) the American political tradition, in which prosecutors are local
political officials who answer to the voters, (2) the adversary tradition, in
which parties control the presentation of evidence and judges are expected to
play a passive and neutral role, (3) a system of pretrial and trial procedures that
is very sophisticated and complicated, (4) exclusive reliance on lay factfinders
at trial coupled with a heavy presumption of finality accorded the decision at
trial and, (5) substantive criminal law that tends to be harsh compared to
systems in other western countries.
This Article is not meant to suggest, however, that we should be satisfied
with the way the American criminal justice functions. Nor is it meant to assert
that abuse of prosecutorial discretion is not a problem or that a system with less
prosecutorial discretion, especially as it is manifested in plea bargaining, would
not be a major improvement in the system. Rather, this Article asserts that if
we wish to reduce prosecutorial discretion, we need to look at the entire system
and see why the system has moved away from adjudication and come to rely
more and more on compromise and negotiation with the result that
prosecutorial discretion occupies center stage in the process. Such an
examination of our political traditions, our legal institutions, our procedures,
and our values would be difficult, controversial, and perhaps even painful. In
undertaking such an examination of our system of justice, the study of foreign
systems of criminal procedure, such as those that share the civil law tradition,
can be tremendously helpful because such systems provide a perspective from
which one can better understand one's own system.
But this Article, using as its example proposals to reform American
prosecutorial discretion using the civil.law model, is skeptical of the notion that
we can improve our system of criminal justice by borrowing important
procedural controls from civil law systems. In the first place, pieces from one
system cannot be easily separated from the rest of that system and isolated for
incorporation in a different legal system. In this case, the concept of an
American prosecutor is necessarily intertwined with our concept of limited
judicial power as well as our concept of what a trial should be. Secondly, a
legal system is much more than a set of procedures for determining guilt and
deciding on sentences. It is tied to important cultural, historical, and political
values, making it unlikely that any reform incorporated from a system that does
not share those values will be adopted or, even if adopted, will ever accomplish
what it was intended to do.

